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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAM, ARABISM DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 13 Feb 81 pp 52-54

[Interview with Fahmi Hawidi by Jihad Fadil: "The Battle Between Islam and Arabism Is an Imaginary Battle Invented by Intellectuals in Air-Conditioned Coffee Shops;" Date and Place of Interview Not Given]

[Text] Fahmi Hawidi says, "Secularism, progressiveness and modernism do not invalidate origins and roots." For the Iranians the plea to put Islam into practice means letting their beards grow before setting people free.

Egyptian thinker, Professor Fahmi Hawidi participated in the intellectual debate that was recently organized in Beirut around the relationship between Arabism and Islam. This is one of the subjects that is being raised now in a manner that is attracting the attention of the intellectuals of the Arab East. Are Arabism and Islam one and the same? Does each one of them have its own special cause? What is the nature of the relationship between the two questions?

AL-HAWADITH met with Fahmi Hawidi and interviewed him about this point and about other heated points among which was the situation of those who have been called in the history of Islam ahl al-dhimma [certain free non-Muslim subjects who are granted protection and safety in return for payment of a poll tax (jizyah)]. [Another point we discussed] was the theoretical and practical position of Islam on the subject. Fahmi Hawidi's position which adheres to a merciful, Islamic course,—if one may say so—became clear during the course of the interview. He thinks that when the Koran mentioned man, it did not state whether that man was Muslim, Christian or Jewish. Man in the Koran, as Mr Muhammad al-Ghazali says, is a human being with the attributes of a creature upon whom honor has been bestowed. Fahmi al-Hawidi adds, "An individual's Islam may give him the edge in the hereafter, but it most certainly does not give him that edge in [this] world. There are verses in the Koran that were revealed for the benefit of the Jews."

About his opinion on an Islamic state and Islamic government—he is currently preparing a book entitled, "muwatinun La Dhimmiyun" [Citizens Not Subjects]—he says, "True Islam is an appeal that must prevail and rule Islamic society. But I do stress that this appeal is perilous even though I adhere to it and my

assertions stem from its grounds." The signs of the course taken by the clergymen in Iran do not promise major success. Regarding the intellectuals who are searching for a relationship between Arabism and Islam he thinks that they are intellectuals looking for a role. "They are persons outside the scene who play no role in the decision making [process] so they looked for a role for themselves arguing about decisions."

The interview began [with a question] about his opinion on Islam's position on dhimmis.

[Answer] It is essential to concede at the outset that this is a problem created by Muslims and by others but not by Islam. This is [one] point.

The second point is that we should distinguish between specific things. We must distinguish between religion, and I mean the texts of the Koran and the true practices of the prophet; between Islamic jurisprudence, and I mean the independent interpretations and explanations of Muslim theologians; and between practices and applications which involve more politics than religion or jurisprudence.

When we seek a decision [on some matter], we must seek it primarily in the [Koranic] texts. My opinion on this matter is that the texts laid down a beginning that many people ignore, forget or do not take into consideration when they deal with this matter.

There are numerous texts in the Koran, for example, that speak about honoring man and about how God breathed His spirit into him and commanded the angels to kneel to Adam. There are many texts that speak about the humanity of man and give him special immunity. I was pleased in this regard with a text written by Professor Muhammad al-Ghazali in which he states that when the Koran mentioned man, it did not mention that he was Muslim, Christian or Jewish. [It mentioned] that he was a human being with the attributes of a creature upon whom honor has been bestowed. I sometimes use the expression, "God's chosen human being." I do not wish to link this, for example, with the notion that man has rights in Islam.

There is a Prophetic Tradition in which the prophet speaks about a woman who entered paradise because she fed a cat and a man who was forgiven because he gave a dog water to drink. There are Prophetic Traditions which discuss the slaughter of animals--and I do not recall the exact text--and say, "If you slaughter an animal, do it righteously." What I want to say in general is that living creatures have a considerable measure of respect in Islam. There are major disagreements in the books of theology on the question of hunting. For some [Muslim] theologians hunting must take place only when it is necessary. This means that a person must not hunt frivolously. Even the sport of hunting may involve aggression against creatures created by God in His wisdom. In discussing the manufacture of silk, Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal even forbids exposing the silkworms to the sun because this would constitute torture of one of God's creatures.

If Islamic thought is generally inclined to bestow upon all of God's creatures a measure of respect, when about God's most distinguished creature, man? The rule from which we ought to approach the question of Muslims and dhimmis should begin with this principle: Islam gave man [a certain] sanctity, and this sanctity is not limited to one and not the other.

I recall in this regard a story about a funeral procession for a Jew passing in front of the Prophet. The prophet stood and one of his companions stood with him. One of those who was standing [nearby] called the Prophet's attention to the fact that this was the funeral of a Jew, and the Prophet replied, "Is not this a soul?" Here the human soul has immunity and sanctity. I think--and this is not excessive personal interpretation on my part, but rather what I glean from reading the texts--that this immunity must always be apparent in people's minds on a permanent basis. This ought to provide a minimum [standard] that would not permit injustice, aggression or impairment of this immunity.

[Question] How do you explain the discrimination that exists between the Muslim and the non-Muslim in some Islamic societies?

[Answer] I am saying that the texts present this image: Islamic thought gives man immunity. Some people may object to the discrimination that takes place in a Muslim society between a Muslim and another. If I may express my opinion on this subject, I would say that Islam did not require any discrimination between one human being and another. I can almost say that the true understanding of Islam is that an individual's Islam may give him the edge in the hereafter, but it most certainly does not do so in this life. When Islam made a distinction between some rights in an Islamic society, it did not do so on the basis of preferring one person to another. It rather made a distinction on the basis of classification and profession. A dhimmi, for example, may not teach the Islamic religion. There is a logic behind this because a Muslim [teacher] here would be better. In common logic, here is a person who is more suitable for a job than another. It is said that in personal affairs problems, for example, there are restrictions on the testimony of others. These may be in the context of Muslims' private affairs [but] they are not based on the principle of preferring one person to another. This discrimination is based on evaluating one's suitability for a position. It is classification and not preference.

This reading of the texts was understood by some theologians one way and by other theologians another way. Before one goes into that subject, one must determine that what theologians are saying here is not part of the religion. It is independent judgment that may or may not be correct. We accept it or reject it according to [our] interests in every age and in every place.

For example, an amusing argument arose among the [Muslim] theologians in the latter part of the 2nd or 3rd century Hegira. This was the question: If a Muslim were to marry an adherent of a revealed religion, that is a dhimmi, can he discuss with her the matter of changing her religion or not? Imam Abu Hanifah said that he may not talk to her about this subject lest he force her. Here is an independent judgment that exalts the value of respecting the feelings of others to the extent of preventing a husband from discussing [this matter] with his wife lest this constitute coercion. Imam al-Shafi'i said that a husband may discuss this matter with his wife but that the matter should never come to coercion. Thus, at a certain stage [Muslim] theologians thought so much about the limits of respecting the beliefs of others that a husband could or could not discuss with his wife the matter of changing her religion.

On the second point I would like to state that even the verse, "There shall be no compulsion in religion. The difference between righteousness and error has been made clear." [The Cow: 256] was revealed for the benefit of the Jews and not for the benefit of Muslims. It was revealed at the time when the Prophet ordered the Jewish tribe of al-Nadir banished from the Arabian Peninsula because they had conspired to kill him twice. The prophet thought that to protect the safety of the call to Islam in its early years, those people should be banished from the Arabian Peninsula. What happened is that some of the women of the tribe whose offspring did not live long, used to vow that if they were to bear children, [and if those children lived], they would offer them as gifts and give them up to the tribe of al-Nadir. When the Prophet ordered that the people of al-Nadir be banished, those women decided to take their children away from the al-Nadir tribe and to make them renounce Judaism and adopt Islam. [Consequently], the verse was revealed, "There is no compulsion in religion." Do not force those people to renounce their Judaism and adopt Islam. This was not a plea to preserve Judaism, but it was at least only a plea to respect faith. So that no confusion would arise around the matter of banishing the people of al-Nadir, one must bear in mind that the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, found manuscripts [belonging to the Jews] when the battle of Khaybar, in which the Jews were defeated, came to an end, and he ordered that these manuscripts be returned to the Jews so they can learn their religion.

Banishing the Jews from the Arabian Peninsula then was not a measure against Jews, but it was a security measure that could have happened to Jews or to others. It was a measure made necessary by the requirements of the call to Islam at that early time.

[Question] But in application some Muslims did not always follow this easy, tolerant line with dhimmis!

[Answer] The Islamic texts give an image that provides full equality to all human beings and gives people immunity and respect.

I do not wish to go into details here. There are numerous verses which state that the Prophet conveys the message and God calls [people] to account. This is understood, but I would add that in addition to these texts [Muslim] theologians, in various historical circumstances and in political circumstances as well that one time favored Muslims and another favored dhimmis, did come out with some independent judgments that were influenced by circumstances.

Let us take Imam Ibn al-Qiyam al-Juziyah, for example, He wrote a book about the regulations for free non-Muslim subjects. He began it by [advocating] sternness in dealing with them. This book is in two volumes and more than 1,500 pages. Ibn al-Juziyah began the book [advocating] considerable sternness to the point that arouses the surprise of the reader who knows Ibn al-Qiyam, a man who has much awareness and understanding. How can he write words that even suggest sternness and fanaticism? Here we ought to read Ibn al-Qiyam in the context of the circumstances under which he lived. These immediately followed the Crusades. Ibn al-Qiyam had published his book before the blood that had been shed then was dry. The Muslim memory and the Muslim psyche were still full of considerable bitterness towards the Christians, especially when it was said that some of the non-Muslims of the East had in one way or another helped the Christians in their endeavors.

Ibn al-Qiyam wrote here words that made him appear to be more stern than he ought to have been. Many people before me have said this. When Ibn al-Qiyam became stern here, he deviated from his custom and from the Islamic thought. But in doing so he was influenced by the general cultural and political climate and by the social scheme that he was experiencing at that time.

[Question] It may be that the system of dhimmis was a system required by circumstances. But do these circumstances still exist?

[Answer] About this there are two observations. The first observation is about the practices that led in some cases to the persecution of the free non-Muslim subjects. We must first say that these practices do not compel anyone to regard them as precedents that are based on independent political judgments. These practices can be accepted, rejected or condemned. It is possible to agree or to disagree with some of them.

Some of these practices were unjust not only for the dhimmis, but also for the Muslims. It's been said, for example, that al-Hakim bi Amr Allah did so and so, but the fact of the matter is that when his injustice was cast on the free non-Muslim subjects, such injustice was not restricted to them; it also applied to the Muslims.

The dhimmi system in Islam was required by certain circumstances. First of all, there was no strong adherence in Islam, at least not in early Islamic practice, to the issue of the jizyah and dhimmah. During that era, the dhimmah was a covenant with corresponding obligations. They always used to say, "Their rights are our rights, and their duties are our duties." Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib said in an eloquent letter to one of his clients, "There are two kinds of people: those who are your equals in religion and those who are your equals in creation."

It has been stated that during the age of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab when the tribe of Bani Taghlib refused to pay the jizyah, 'Umar went along with that and turned the jizyah into a charitable gift. It was understood at that time that a holy war was a holy war [fought] for the cause of God to convey [His] message. It was logical at that time for the dhimmis not to be asked to fight in a holy war. A dhimmi is not expected to raise the banner of holy war to defend Islam. This may also take us back to a statement we made at the outset that discrimination does not take place in the context of preference but rather in the context of classification and employment. In a holy war [fought] for the cause of God it is more appropriate for a Muslim to come forward. A non-Muslim is not expected to do so.

To make up for that, dhimmis used to pay the jizyah. What lends support to [the notion that] the matter is related to the holy war is the fact that the jizyah then was imposed only on those who, according to the contemporary expression, were of conscription age.

The system of dhimmis was required by certain circumstances at that historical stage. These circumstances no longer exist. Accordingly, nothing could be easier than to overlook this point without coming into conflict with the texts, but rather agreeing with them.

It has been added that when [the tribe of] Taghlib stipulated that they not pay the jizyah, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab went along and did not insist on a specific text. There is gross misunderstanding of the verse that states, "...until they pay tribute out of hand and are utterly subdued" [Repentance: 29]. Some theologians said that "out of hand" meant submissiveness, but most of them said the verse referred to the ability to pay and not to submissiveness. About "utterly subdued" some people also said they [would pay the tax] in humiliation, whereas others said that humiliation was not intended because this would take us back to a fundamental position rejecting that human being. "Utterly subdued" here implies defeat. The discussion here is about war, about fighting. The verses go on to add that when those people are defeated, they ought to pay the jizyah if they can afford to do so. Some people interpret these verses literally and argue that they contain a stipulation that makes their degradation and humiliation necessary, and this is something that contradicts one of Islam's basic positions on the question of man.

There is a Prophetic Tradition which states that Islam exalts but that there is nothing more exalted than Islam. Some people took that to mean that no dhimmi was to live in a house that was higher than that of a Muslim. This is how much the Prophetic Tradition is misunderstood. What is intended here is that the supreme word in an Islamic society belongs to Islam.

We go on to say that the subject of dhimmis has assumed much more importance than in fact it should. It ought to be dealt with in the light of Islam's basic position which respects others regardless of their feelings and beliefs because [a man] in this case is the descendant of that man who was honored by God, the man to whom the angels had kneeled and the man who was animated by God's spirit.

[Question] As you know conflicting appeals are being made in the Arab east. There is nationalism which is almost synonymous in the minds of its advocates with secularism. There are advocates of Islam who are calling for an Islamic state in every sense of the word. And there are [other] innumerable appeals. Do you believe in the establishment of a religious state in this age?

[Answer] Before I answer, we must agree on specific definitions. You say Islam, and this is a matter that requires definition. You say secularism, and this too is a matter that requires definition. I believe that this secularism is one of the basic problems that exists among the advocates of Islam--if one may use such an expression. This is because secularism can now encompass meanings that include proclaiming war against religion and separating church and state. We often call for the necessity to agree on a specific definition. If the subject is one of proclaiming war against religion, this problem is not relevant, but [if we are talking about] the separation of church and state, let us define matters further to see how far [this separation should go].

I have become very apprehensive of the adjectives, "modern," "enlightened" and "progressive" because they now impart the sense of being uprooted under the pretext of modernism and the sense of eliminating principles under the pretext of progressiveness. The truth is that I fear these descriptions will make us falter after they have been expanded so as to imply more than the words can bear. However, so that I would not start an argument about definitions let me say that

I, as a Muslim man, with my humble knowledge of Islamic thought proceed from the assertion that true Islam must prevail in and rule Islamic society. But I stress that this call is perilous despite my adherence to it and despite the fact that I grew up on its grounds. Nevertheless, I do say that it is an extremely dangerous call in the sense that many people misunderstand what it stands for and they also apply it incorrectly. They imagine that "putting Islam into practice" is very easy to do and that no more is required but to take the seats of government. I believe that this is an extremely serious fallacy. It may be that Iran's experience is an extremely clear example of this. The clergy there undertook to administer and to manage all the affairs of the state, and they were not qualified to do so. They oversimplified matters, and they forced Islam into areas where it did not belong. They forced themselves into areas they do not understand—although we ought to be fair, these were things they were not fully aware of.

The appeal for putting Islam into practice is a basic one, but it is also an appeal that is perilous. Let us agree first on specific priorities. Do we begin, as they say, by letting our beards grow or by letting freedom grow? Some people said [do we begin by] educating the individual or by taking over power? Do they say, "constitution", for example? The Koran in itself is a book of guidance that includes over 6,000 verses. The [ones that contain] rulings about which there is debate do not exceed 400, and this is not a negligible ratio.

There is a huge world of Islamic thought that is ruled by these verses, but many people leave all these and start by growing their beards, for example. I advocate putting Islam into practice, but I also warn a great deal against doing so. There must be lengthy preparation and broad experience, clergymen may participate in some measure [in this effort]. However, putting Islam into practice is certainly neither suitable nor authorized for clergymen, since there are no clergymen in Islam but rather students of religion. We all know [Muslim] theologians and prophets who were tradespeople, merchants or others.

We must then agree on specific definitions because some notions are burdened with contradictions. We need new definitions for many of the terms that are often used on the scene by the Islamic side, the national side or the secular side. The Islamic side itself must know what it means by its Islam and how far is its commitment to the texts. The nationalist must also know [what he means].

The second point is that I support the call for Islam and the strong belief that Islam is suitable for application; that it does not conflict with the interests of any party; that it provides many rights for others; and that if practices are poorly applied, the texts must not be blamed. But I caution that unless one is knowledgeable and can confront this question, delving into this matter can be perilous.

[Question] In Beirut you took part in a conference that pertains to the relationship between Arabism and Islam. How do you view the problem of the relationship between them?

[Answer] I can almost say that this is an imaginary battle, and then I can almost say that such subjects are not raised by the requirements of reality. However, there is a group of intellectuals looking for a role for themselves. The intellectuals were thrown out of the scene or they left the scene, and they no longer had a role in [the process of] making decisions, so they looked for a role in arguing about the decisions.

Today we are confronting numerous incidents. When we try to define our positions—and I do not think that anyone of us defined his position on any question that is being discussed, whether it is Camp David and Afghanistan or Iraq and Iran—none of us asks himself before defining his position on something, if he should define it from an Islamic or from an Arab premise? There are general values: aggression is aggression; occupation is occupation. But is the occupation from an Islamic perspective or from an Arab perspective? This is a problem that ought not to be raised, but it is being raised by people who sit in air-conditioned rooms or coffee shops.

It is no longer possible to separate the Muslims. Arabism is in our blood, and Islam has been mixed with the blood of each one of us in this nation whether he is a Muslim or dhimmi. The Islam that protects people here protects some from an ideological premise and protects others from a cultural premise. We are all children of the same civilization. There is the Islamic culture and the Islamic background. This is a matter that has no relationship whatsoever with the necessity of adopting the Islamic faith. This is the background that rules us all in all our beliefs, our schools of philosophy and our inclinations. It has become part of our principles, and ultimately we have become the product of these principles. It is difficult to say that the heart of this being that lives in the heart of this nation is Arab and that its arm is Muslim. This is one body. Separating any part from the other will cause that body permanent disability. The separation between the two is contrived and it disfigures the human mind and body in this region of the world. The attempt by the advocates of Arabism or the advocates of Islam to abolish either one of them is an attempt to incapacitate and to paralyze our men.

Suspensions have naturally been raised between the advocates of Arabism and the advocates of Islam. There is also a measure of bitterness that still lingers in the hearts of some advocates of Islam as a result of the conflict that occurred between the July Revolution and the Islamic Movement in Egypt. It was a regrettable conflict that generated a feeling of bitterness in the Islamic Movement throughout the Arab world. It was necessarily the lasting position of the symbolic figures of Arab nationalism. It was a regrettable conflict that should never have happened. There is no point in going into the reasons for it, but we are talking about its consequences.

There are two questions: Ataturk and what he did after the caliphate was abolished, and the question of the conflict that occurred between the July Revolution and the Islamic Movement in Egypt. These two questions have left considerable questions and much bitterness in the minds of the advocates of Islam.

The honest advocates, of nationalism fear two matters: the relationship of Muslims to dhimmis—I imagine this is settled in the texts and that there is a formula that would relieve everyone if it is dealt with by reasonable people; and the point about the senseless application of Islam and perhaps some of the practices of the clergymen in Iran. Will this be repeated in the future? This is what is worrying the advocates of nationalism. It is my opinion that each one of the two groups is to explain his position. What do the advocates of nationalism mean by so and so, and what do the advocates of Islam mean by so and so?

[Question] Egypt has been absent and it has been missed. Because of Egypt's importance in forging the Arab future, some intellectuals in the Arab East are advocating that Egypt be "Arabicized" on the one hand and that the Arabs be "Egyptianized" on the other. What do you think about such an appeal?

[Answer] I do not deny that the expression, "Arabicizing" Egypt and "Egyptianizing" the Arabs is eloquent and clever. It is a plea for the heart to return to the body and for the heart to live in a sound body. This is a plea about which no one disagrees.

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MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMY

Increasing Food Production

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 26 Mar 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Boosting Up Food Production"]

[Excerpts] The Saur Revolution came with a grand slogan "food, house, and clothes for all the people of Afghanistan." Under this slogan the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, DRA government and hard working people are striving to boost up production in the country.

It was the lack of responsibilities on the part of the past ruling exploitative circles that agriculture was left undeveloped and millions of acres of land were not brought under water to contribute to the higher production and land fertility.

Since the Saur Revolution and especially its new evolutionary phase growing bumper crops has been one of the targets of the development efforts and the projects undertaken by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

We have to admit that despite many rivers and streams the availability of sufficient water the year around is one of the main problems facing our agriculture today.

The country lacks sufficient number of dams and barrages to retain water for the summer when great need is felt for water to irrigate agricultural land in different parts of the country. The old methods of irrigation employed by our hard working peasants all over the country are in effect one of the factors responsible for the lack of growth of agriculture in Afghanistan.

It is time now for our progressive regime to harness the wild rivers and construct irrigation canals with the assistance of the friendly country the Soviet Union and other countries. The new irrigation systems should be built in such a way as to cope with the requirements of a growing agricultural country hoping to develop, at the same time, its industrial output.

In the current year development plan, greater attention has been fortunately paid to the development of agricultural output in an attempt to bring the country close to the level of self-sufficiency in grain. It is hoped that the problem of distribution of equitable water to the peasants will receive better attention to enable the peasants to get their equal share of irrigation water.

The law for distribution of equitable water is being drafted. With the approval and enforcement of this law one of the standing agricultural problems will be solved. In the course of history the influential landlords and feudalists usually usurped the water right of the poor peasants and downtrodden. The PDPA and DRA government has fully realised this problem and it is expected that they will solve it soon.

The development of animal husbandry and livestock breeding is also a central issue in agricultural development plan. With the proper handling of this problem it is expected that the shortage of food will completely be met in the near future.

Many of the export items of Afghanistan come from livestock. This section of agriculture should be given fresh impetus and encouragement so that not only domestic consumption will be met but the volume of foreign trade will also be promoted in the interest of the development of the national economy.

Along with the development of agriculture the problem of clothing and housing will also be solved. Effective measures have already been adopted in this regard in the light of the aspirations of Saur Revolution.

With the rapid pace the DRA government is moving ahead towards the development of various aspects of the life of the people of Afghanistan it is expected that the question of food, clothing and housing will find an effective solution. The solution of the problem of food, clothing and housing will positively affect the life of the entire hard working people of Afghanistan, paving the way for social and economic construction of the country at large.

Cooperation With USSR

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 31 Mar 81 p 1

[Text] Kabul, March 31 (Bakhtar)--The second session of the Afghan-Soviet standing joint commission for economic cooperation between the two countries began here yesterday.

All aspects of the progress of the implementation of agreements on economic, technical and trade cooperation between the two countries are assessed at this session.

At the session the Afghan delegation was headed by Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Vice-President of the Revolutionary Council and DRA Deputy Prime Minister, and the Soviet delegation by Simon Skachkov, member of the CPSU CC and President of the State Committee of the USSR for Economic Cooperation with foreign countries.

The two delegations are represented at the talks by the Minister of Public Works, Mines and Industries, First Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Committee and some other high-ranking Afghan officials as well as the Soviet Ambassador to Kabul and some ranking staff of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul.

Simon Skachkov, heading a high-power Soviet economic delegation arrived here yesterday. He was welcomed at the Kabul International Airport by Keshtmand, some other Afghan leaders and members of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul.

Before the talks, Skachkov met Keshtmand at the headquarters of the DRA State Planning Committee.

According to another report, a reception was given by Keshtmand in honour of Skachkov and his companions at the Foreign Ministry's Reception Hall last night.

The reception was attended by Noor Ahmad Noor, member of the PDPA CC, Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA and member of RC Presidium, Dastagir Panjsheri, member of the PDPA CC Politburo, Gen. Abdul Qadir, Aslam Watanjar and Gen. Gul Aqa, members of the PDPA CC and RC Presidium, Abdurrashid Arian, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, some other members of PDPA CC, members of the Council of Ministers, party cadres and high-ranking Government officials and the Soviet Ambassador to Kabul.

At the reception, speeches were made by Keshtmand and Skachkov on the amicable and fraternal relations and the economic cooperation between the DRA and the USSR.

A concert was given by Afghan artists at the function.

Government Auditors Admonished

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 29 Mar 81 p 1

[Text] Kabul, March 29 (Bakhtar)--The first seminar of the auditors and inspectors of the Comptroller's Office of the Prime Ministry, was inaugurated by Sultan Ali Keshtmand, member of PDPA CC Politburo, Vice President of RC and Deputy Prime Minister, at the Health Institute auditorium yesterday.

In his speech Sultan Ali Keshtmand said: "The new revolutionary phase of our national democratic revolution has made it the order of the day to democratise the state machinery and change it into a machinery to serve the people."

The objective is to put into service the state administrative machinery for building a new and democratic society and make use of all resources, including material and manpower, to raise the material and morale living standard of the people of the country," he added.

State Machinery

The Deputy Prime Minister drew the attention of the members of the Comptroller's Office to their grave and revolutionary duties and said, "You esteemed auditors and inspectors are expected to carry out your duties with revolutionary spirit and patriotism, consciously and with full realisation of your obligations for the purpose of serving the people and in order to eliminate bureaucracy and corruption in the state administrative machinery, to prevent misappropriations and unwise and uneconomic use of public properties, thus contributing towards economic and social progress and development of your country."

Keshtmand described this seminar as an important step towards the smooth fulfillment of duties on the part of the members of the Comptroller's Office. He wished further successes for the participants in the seminar, towards realisation of their planned work during the current year.

Statement on Control

The president of the Comptroller's Office of the Prime Ministry spoke on the objective and importance of the seminar and on the duties of the members of the Comptroller's Office and read the fundamental statement of the seminar. He said the seminar would discuss a series of problems relating to auditing and inspection in the state administrations and organisations, and familiarise the auditors and inspectors with their revolutionary duties under the prevailing conditions.

The fundamental statement of control and inspection and the first quarter of the plan of the Comptroller's Office was explained and conclusions were drawn.

The opening session was also attended by Abdul Wakil, member of the PDPA CC, Minister of Finance and employees of the Finance Ministry.

CSO: 4920

INTERVIEW WITH PREMIER REFLECTS ON REVOLUTION'S ACHIEVEMENTS

LD091505 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 Apr 81 p 8

[Interview with Prime Minister Raja'i marking Islamic Republic Day by KEYHAN; date and location not specified: "The Revolutionary Clergy Were in the Forefront of the Creation of the Islamic Republic"]

[Excerpts] [Question] Now that three springs have passed since the referendum on the Islamic Republic, has the Islamic revolution been a complete success?

[Answer] In my view, the revolution has succeeded, but it is doubtful if the word "complete" may be used for anything other than the rule of the Mahdi (peace be upon him), our twelfth imam (Messianic figure in Shi'ite Islam). The revolution has made remarkable progress in various areas; I should mention in particular the people's genuine cooperation with the government. We have an ideologically-inclined government, one which strives to implement Islamic precepts in accordance with the teachings of the most renowned Islamic law scholars. The people are cooperating admirably in solving the difficulties which have arisen in the country. I think that the best example of this is the way that young people of 20 have been administering the affairs of the thousands of war refugees. Our loved ones are fighting in large numbers for the defense of the revolution, and they are advancing group by group to embrace martyrdom. If the revolution had not been a success, and if the people had not taken the government to their hearts, then naturally there would have been no good will and they would not have shown so much devotion as they have shown to the preservation of the revolution. However, there is no doubt that the breadth and depth of the revolution are so fast that, even with the progress made over the past 2 years, one cannot say that it has succeeded, in the usual sense of the word. Problems do exist in practice, and our only hope lies in the ideology of the revolution and its supporters, that is, ordinary, genuine people.

[Question] What powers and personalities were in the forefront of the creation of the Islamic Republic?

[Answer] As regards the powers and personalities in the forefront of the creation of the Islamic Republic, I think that we must concentrate here on the "Islamic Republic," since if you ask me who led the people's victory over the shah, or who engaged in revolutionary struggles, then my answer would certainly be different.

As regards solely the creation of the Islamic Republic, I would like to come back to what I said in the Majlis when the cabinet was formed: Those who have accepted the culture of the revolutionaries of Sar Cheshmeh, Martyrs' Square, Yazd, Tabriz and Qom, that is to say, those who believe only in the leadership of the imam as the Marj'at al-Taqlid [supreme authority in Shi'ite Islam] and who believed in this from the outset, those who have broken all other links and placed themselves lock, stock and barrel at the disposal of the republic--I prefer not to cite names--I personally believe that they were led by the revolutionary clergy, with its genuine attitude to the people and Islam, a clergy which practices Islam in its daily life. The finest example of this is the Imam.

[Question] To what extent have the political and economic difficulties of the Islamic Republic been eliminated?

[Answer] In my view, when the Islamic Republic has set up its essential organs, we shall be able to say that that is a great victory for the Islamic Republic, the Constitution, the Council of Wise Men, the president, the Majlis and the prime minister. These are the political successes of the republic: successes we have gained include the struggle against Eastern and Western powers to attain the goal of "neither East nor West," and the emphasis on the implementation of Islamic precepts within the country in order to achieve the creation of the Islamic Republic.

In the field of economics, I must say that while our economic philosophy is very progressive, this cannot be said for our economic techniques. By our economic philosophy being progressive I mean that the people have accepted a modest standard of living and of dress, as well as low consumption. They have given up extravagance.

But as for our economic techniques, no: in my view, before the government was formed, we were following an economic policy taken from the West, from America or Europe, and the formulas introduced were basically inspired by the West. When the government was formed, we tried hard to transform our economy into an Islamic one. The only thing we succeeded in doing in this field was to put a stop to the prevalence of Western vogues in the economy at all costs, that is to say, we tried as hard as we could to prevent Western economic laws being enacted here, though I must honestly say that few Islam-based laws dealing with the economy have been passed. However, we do not despair either; I personally believe that those countries which have recently undergone revolution and have been over-hasty in choosing an economic system for their country have slipped easily into the lap of Marxism. We shall discover the economic order of the Islamic Republic solely through our beloved clergy and Islamic scholars. We must recognize this as a vast problem, and if, God forbid, we are overhasty, the revolution will suffer from deviations. As the prime minister, I have decided to resist formulas taken from East or West with all the power I have, and in my meetings with the supreme religious authorities and brother Muslim economists I recommend and insist that they help the government to create an economic system for the Islamic Republic.

PASSPORT OFFICE ISSUES NEW EXIT REQUIREMENTS

Tehran KEYHAN AIRMAIL EDITION in Persian 18 Mar 81 p 11

[Excerpts] KEYHAN City Service--The Prime Minister's Secretariat has announced in a communique some additional conditions for leaving the country, and bringing them to a total of 11. In a special press conference yesterday with KEYHAN, Col 'Abdorrezza Sa'idpur, chief of the Passport Office, explained these conditions. Colonel Sa'idpur said that according to recent disposition by the cabinet, some new conditions for permission to leave the country have been issued, increasing the total to 11; and the 11 conditions are as follows:

1. The case of persons living abroad, the special conditions for which must be approved by the proper authorities.
2. Students living abroad with permission of the Ministry of Science.
3. Businessmen who must be sponsored by the Ministry of Commerce or by other pertinent organizations.
4. Drivers of vehicles and freight trucks.
5. Sick persons whose need to go abroad has been approved by the authorities of the Health Ministry.
6. Government employees and officials who go abroad on assignments by government ministries and organizations.
7. Iranians who hold resident permits in foreign countries approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
8. Parents who have minor children abroad and whose children abroad need supervision which must be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
9. Parents whose children abroad have become sick and need parental supervision which must also be approved by the proper authorities. In both cases, exit permit will be granted to one parent only.
10. Foreign wives of Iranian men having acquired Iranian citizenship through marriage.
11. Iranian women who have foreign husbands and wish to leave the country after being approved by the Bureau of Alien Affairs due to the fact that their husbands do not live in Iran or after the cancellation of their residence permit and upon issuance of an exit visa.

CSO: 4906

BRIEFS

RAJA'I TO CABINET MEETING--According to a Central News Unit report, Prime Minister Raja'i who is visiting Zahedan to attend the joint meeting of the cabinet ministers and the country's governor generals, arrived this morning in Zabol and was warmly received at the airport by provincial officials, the clergy, revolutionary institutions' supervisors and a group of Moslem people of this region. Accompanying Mr Raja'i on his visit to Zabol was the governor general of Sistan and Baluchestan. During the welcoming ceremonies at the airport, the governor of Zabol in his welcoming speech referred to Sistan and Baluchestan's past position and briefed the premier on issues which the region is facing. Later the premier and his entourage toured the (Miyan Jangi) region and also Shandoul village, which is situated 25 km from Zabol. On his tour of Shandoul, the prime minister spoke to a number of the deprived villagers who talked to the prime minister about their living conditions and agricultural issues. On his way to (Miyan Jangi) and return to Zabol, the prime minister visited the Baghchehban School in the village of Kolokeh. He later toured Zabol Garrison, speaking to the soldiers, NCOs and the officer of this garrison. Later the prime minister left Zabol Garrison for the garrison's mosque where he met Zabol citizens. [Text] [LD091240 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 9 Apr 81]

ITALIAN ENVOY RECEIVED--According to a Central News Unit report, the Italian ambassador to Tehran met and conferred with Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the Majlis speaker, at the latter's office at noon today. They discussed and reviewed mutual economic and political ties. The Italian ambassador said: The Italian people are following with interest the revolution's developments and its independence trend based on faith. We support Iran's constructive regional role. In reply, the Majlis speaker said: I would like to thank you for your remarks and the attention paid to our revolution, with its cultural and spiritual independence, which is part of our Islamic revolution's dimension. I hope, with the possibilities existing in Iran and in Italy, providing we act sincerely and avoid the superpowers' influence, to develop our cooperation. [Text] [LD092114 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 9 Apr 81]

NEW ABADAH POWER STATION--The technical department of FARS Power Department has completed a 1,100 power generator in Abadeh, which is now operational. The Public Relations Department of FARS Power Department has announced that this project has been completed at a cost of 50 million rials. [GF041724 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1530 GMT 4 Apr 81 GF]

KHOMAYNI RECEIVES 3,000 IRAQIS--On the first anniversary of the martyrdom of the great Islamic thinker Ayatullah al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Imam Khomeyni, leader of the nation's march and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, received 3,000 of our Iraqi Muslim brothers who have deported from their country, accompanied by Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, secretary general of the movement of Mujahidin Ulema in Iraq, at Hoseynieh Jamaran [in Tehran] today. In a speech he delivered during the meeting the nation's Imam asserted that the Iranian and Iraqi people are not two peoples, for all Muslim people are one nation. His Eminence said: It is the people who should arise and revolt so as to save themselves from the evildoers. The people should not wait until other persons come to save them. We must save ourselves by ourselves. His Eminence added: The Iraqi Army will join Iraqi Muslims if they should arise and revolt to eradicate the roots of corruption in their country. [Text] [GF091148 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1100 GMT 9 Apr 81]

RAJA'I TOURS SISTAN VILLAGES--Prime Minister Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i who arrived together with the members of his cabinet in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan Va Baluchestan Province, yesterday to attend the joint meeting of the government and governors today inspected villagers' homes in the village of (Sandud), Zabol, and talked to the villagers about their problems. The prime minister also inspected Kurukhi village school and thanked the school's officials, who despite their meager facilities are communicating the Islamic revolution's voice of the villagers' children. Brother Raja'i then inspected the camp in Zabol. He held two meetings: the first with the camp's commanders with whom he discussed some military matters; the second meeting was held at the camp's mosque. Ulema, local officials and representatives of revolutionary organizations participated in the meeting. [Text] [GF091204 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1100 GMT 9 Apr 81]

IRANIANS IN KUWAIT CONTRIBUTE--PARS News Agency reports that the Iranian community in Kuwait has contributed 2.7 million riyals to the victims of the aggressive war the Iraqis have imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran. [Text] [GF091916 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 9 Apr 81]

IRAQIS IN IRAN--The movement of the Mujahidin Ulema in Iraq has called on Muslim Iraqi brothers and sisters in the Islamic Republic of Iran to gather in Imam Khomeyni Square between 0730 and 0830 on Thursday and then proceed to Hoseyniyeh Jamaran to meet the leader of the Islamic revolution, Imam Khomeyni, and to offer condolences to his eminence on the first anniversary of the martyrdom of the Islamic figure, Ayatullah Al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr. In a statement issued on this occasion, the movement has called on all brothers and sisters to attend the eulogy that will be held at the Martyr Motahheri School for Religious Studies that afternoon. The Iraqi Islamic Al-Da'wah Party has also called on all Iraqis in Tehran to join this gathering in order to meet the leader of the Islamic revolution, Imam Khomeyni, at his residence. The Islamic Al-Da'wah Party has called on the Muslim masses and Iraqi Islamic organizations in Tehran to join this mass meeting and also to participate in the ceremony that will be held at the Martyr Motahheri School for Religious Studies in Tehran on the same afternoon. [Text] [GF071234 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1100 GMT 7 Apr 81]

KHOMAYNI SEES MAJLIS DEPUTY--Imam Khomeyni yesterday received members of the Esfahan Mobilization Bureau, the Zahedan (Narjes) Bureau and [members of] the Hadi Mosque in Tehran. The leader of the nation and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran also received yesterday Majlis deputy Hojjat ol-Islam Mohammad Mojtahed (Shabastari), who held talks with His Eminence. [Text] [GF100454 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 10 Apr 81]

FISHERY DELEGATION TO EUROPE--The director of the Iranian Fishery Company left for Europe today heading a delegation to study the prospects of exporting Iranian (khavijar) [caviar/sturgeon] to Europe. PARS News Agency has reported that the delegation will visit the FRG, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, France, Belgium, Britain, The Netherlands and Sweden. [Text] [GF050929 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0900 GMT 5 Apr 81]

CSO: 4902

DAYAN INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL PLANS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 16

/Article by Yosef Harif: "Dayan: If Members of the Alignment Want To Make Sure That I Run in the Elections, Let Them Continue With Their Threats"/

/Text/ "If they want to make sure beyond any doubt that I run (in the elections), let them continue with this," said Moshe Dayan this week--the week during which the Committee on Constitution, Law and Justice set June 30 as the date for the elections to the Knesset.

"They" means various members of the Alignment.

"With this," with the hidden threats against Dayan not to run on an independent list to the Knesset "for his own good" and with the hints that, if he does, the Yom Kippur oversight will inevitably resurface and people will again begin to probe his character and actions.

According to Dayan, all these will only assure his heading an independent list.

It seems that even the title conferred on Moshe Dayan's nonexistent list by Shimon Peres this week--one of the "fragments"--cannot deter the man, who apparently has resolved to head a new list, if only because he fears for the fate of the Land of Israel if the Alignment returns to power.

"This is a scandal second to none," says Dayan about the Alignment's political stand on the settlement possible, according to it, in Judaea and Samaria. "In their platform they talk about 'peace in stages.' What does this mean? This means only that they are prepared to evacuate the areas on the bank and to hand them over to Hussein even if peace is not made. This is the only meaning of the concept 'peace in stages;' And all the talk about 'a little area for little peace' is empty talk, which only hides the bitter truth: They in Saudi Arabia, where King Hussein is also present, are talking about jihad and the destruction of Israel and are running to get Leopard-2 (superior tanks made in Germany), while we will offer evacuation of the areas, even from the back of the mountain, in exchange for 'little peace.' This is a real scandal."

Between the RAHEL List and the WERED List

Therefore, it is easy to imagine why the Alignment is so afraid of Moshe Dayan. Probably, Dayan will admit that he does not "enjoy" it when he is drawn into a debate on the Yom Kippur War (especially as, according to his estimate, at the time elements in the Alignment did not hesitate to organize demonstrations of bereaved parents against him). But it seems that, basically, the Alignment also knows that only in this way--pointing out "faults"--it will be impossible to defeat Moshe Dayan. And what value is there in the Alignment reminding Moshe Dayan of Yom Kippur? After all, after the Yom Kippur War the center of the Labor Party unanimously voted to include Moshe Dayan on its list. Not only that, but it accepted his conditions (in connection with the formulations concerning Judaea and Samaria). And in the last elections, despite Yom Kippur, he was placed on the sixth spot on the Alignment List. Was he O.K. then and now, because he is to run on an independent list to the Knesset, they will remind him of Yom Kippur or any other "sin" in his public life?

The dilemma of the Alignment is understandable. In the past, despite all what Dayan did or did not do (from moving barrels to the Yom Kippur War), the Alignment included him on its list to the Knesset. And now, when everyone sees him as one of the architects of the peace with Egypt (an act for which he was also praised by many people in the Alignment), is it possible to come out against him?

Apparently, however, the Alignment will have no choice but to face the double rivalry that Dayan has decreed on it--the Likud, on the one hand, and Dayan's list, on the other--when the distance between Dayan and the Likud, with all the implications for the future of the government, apparently, is very, very small. The Alignment admits one thing, which could also be felt during the television interview of Shimon Peres: Without this "fragment" of the National Emergency List, that is, Moshe Dayan, in the next elections it would be easier for the Alignment to attain a majority that would enable it to dictate the composition of the next government headed by it.

Moreover, if the Alignment emerges from the elections with the largest number of votes and is given the task to form the government, it will not be able to count on Dayan's list. Moshe Dayan said the following to his close associates, the only ones that are privy to his thoughts and purposeful talks, which he conducts with various figures: "We will not run in the elections to be part of the coalition. We are not interested in the post of minister or minister and a half and, theoretically, if I am asked to join the coalition I will be able to answer: 'No, thank you...'"

In fact, Dayan expressed in this way the special nature of the list that he will head. It is not a question of establishing a new party with branches, but a special list resulting from the emergency conditions in which the state is. (Incidentally, the "emergency list" does not yet have a name and Dayan remarked about the play on the acronym RAHEL, his wife's name: "The 'Eyn Wered group (close to Dayan's heart in many respects) also can provide a name for the list: WERED, an acronym of Weizmann, RAFI, Dayan...")

Actually, for now Dayan cannot even say who the people on his list are and, in any case, it is difficult to form acronyms that will express the main components of his list (someone heard him say, for example, that Weizmann is more "Peace for Now" and in favor of a Palestinian state. Therefore, it is difficult to see both of them running on one emergency list...)

In general, Dayan has resolved to keep silent about the image of the finished product. But from talks with his close associates a true picture of "Dayan's list" begins to emerge. With regard to its political principles it is clear that the idea of "partial autonomy" will be the focus of the political platform. With regard to its social and economic principles Moshe Dayan's pragmatic approach is also expressed in it. "There is a need for economic rehabilitation and, therefore, we should impose restrictions on the public and not make things easier for it... Let taxes be imposed... It is time to act and with regard to action in this area I am from the house of Shamay. If necessary (because of economic restrictions), I will sell my house in Zahala."

The Pound in Contrast to the Dollar: Israeli Uniqueness

"After all, the problem is not what Yassir Arafat wants and not what various states in the United Nations say, but if the Jewish people really want to preserve their state, the State of Israel, for its uniqueness, because it cannot compete with the standard of living of other states," maintains Dayan.

"True, it is perhaps easier to live in the United States on a salary in dollars, but we must instill the feeling that the pound is worth more than the dollar, because 'dollar' means that there my children will grow and will be brought up only in English, but on culture whose heroes are Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, or one general or another. They will know nothing about the Inquisition, about Spain, about our heroes and about the Holocaust and Israel will mean nothing to them. Therefore, materially, we have no other means of competition than to say that this pound, this small and contemptible pound, which declines in contrast to the dollar every morning, has uniqueness. This is Israeli uniqueness and all this effort exists for it..."

Perhaps many people, including Dayan's admirers, were not used to hear these thoughts from him. But, as is well known, for some time he has been troubled by the thought: What next? The fathers came here on a road of great hardship not only during the period of the Holocaust and illegal immigration and the sons are emigrating by planes with pockets stuffed with dollars.

Perhaps this faith burning in him today, at an age when, in general, political figures begin to think about the end of the road, impels Moshe Dayan to remain in the political arena, the arena of action. This consciousness determines both factors--the path and the people with whom he wants to run. The Labor Party certainly has people of vision and realization, although not necessarily among those that are to form the official leadership if the Alignment wins in the elections. But he does not give marks to one man or another. His main debate concerns the path. He firmly believes that what the Alignment offers, for example, in the political area ("Jordanian option") constitutes a disaster for the State of Israel. Nor is

he excited by the formulations in the economic and social area, by means of which an attempt is made to convince the public that the Alignment can succeed where the Likud failed. Was what the Alignment now offers really never tried?... Is the problem only "to make it easier for the people" by subsidies? The problem is to demand from the people an effort, sometimes even a burdensome one.

But, naturally, the political debate will be in the center of the battle that Dayan will wage personally. And the debate will be mainly with the Alignment, because, if indeed there is a chance for the Alignment to return to power (as the polls forecast), it is necessary to explain to the people what this means and what lies behind the "Jordanian option." After all, it is a question, even as far as the Alignment is concerned, of the Hussein of today, not of yesterday. Yesterday at all the meetings Hussein also rejected every idea of a territorial compromise, whereas today he says openly that he sees in the PLO the representatives of the Palestinians...

And what does the Alignment offer to Hussein today? "Is there an aggravation here as compared to the previous platform of the Labor Party?"

"The formulation adopted by the Labor Party," states Dayan "says that the regions of the Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion and the areas surrounding Jerusalem will be under Israel's sovereignty during peacetime. This means that they (Alignment) are prepared to evacuate all the rest. Let them not tell me that the intention is to demilitarize all this. All the rest, including the back of the mountain, is to be evacuated. Incidentally, according to the map of the Alignment, Gush 'Etzion does not include Qiryat Arba. Was this accidental or intended?"

Dayan knows that, among other things, people will argue that David Ben Gurion also said that in exchange for peace we must satisfy ourselves with Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Dayan says to this: "I don't know who heard what Ben Gurion said, but I know what he wrote. And, according to all views, written testimony is more convincing than what they said that he said... I also heard things from him personally and they are different from what, for example, Abba Eban attributed to him. But let us leave oral statements alone.

"For example, this is what David Ben Gurion wrote about Hebron on 25 January 1970: '... We must not forget: The beginning of one of the great kings of Israel was in Hebron, the city to which the first Hebrew came about 800 years before King David. We will make a tremendous and terrible mistake if we do not establish a big, growing Jewish settlement in Hebron, Jerusalem's neighbor and predecessor, in the shortest time. This will also be a blessing to our Arab neighbors. Hebron is worthy of being Jerusalem's sister.' Well, let them not quote Ben Gurion to justify the evacuation of the areas..."

"Should I Be More Extreme Than Carter?"

Incidentally, when a few days ago it was decided to remove by force the invaders of the HABAD House in Hebron, Dayan did not react to this publicly--neither to the invasion, nor to the removal of the invaders by force. But in private talks he said: "If I had been in the government, I would not have rushed to a decision.

I would have struggled hard..., although for practical reasons (the need to assign an IDF unit to guard duty) I can justify the government decision. But as a matter of principle? Why are Jews forbidden to live in Hebron in a house that belongs to Jews? Even President Carter said at one time that Jews were allowed to live in Judaea and Samaria. After all, an Arab citizen is not evicted from his place and we are dealing with land, a house or a certificate of registration for property indicating Jewish ownership... Do I have to be more extreme than Carter?"

If so, what is the difference between Dayan and the Likud?

The truth is that the difference is not big, except for the fact that Dayan does not believe that the policy of autonomy, the way it is conducted by the government, can lead to a settlement in Judaea and Samaria. It is another question whether others believe that "his partial autonomy" is the solution. But this is not important now, when the battle that he is to declare against the Alignment is discussed.

Some people still wonder whether Moshe Dayan, indeed, has resolved to run on an independent list. It seems that his decision on this matter is final. In his close inner circle it is known that he is handling such practical matters in connection with the formation of the list that it is difficult to assume that he has different intentions.

For example, he is talking about the need for a "diversified list." This means that the formation of the list is a fact--it only should be diversified.

What does "diversified" mean?

The intention is to have in it people of vision and action from all currents, but mainly people capable of forming a "national unity government" in the classic sense of the concept, that is, the realization that during an emergency period we cannot foster so-called class differences instead of concentrating on the main thing.

In general, he avoids throwing names, but here and there several figures are mentioned and it can be seen that he does not intend to have only "stars." For example, the following appeal to him: Yosef'le Tabenkin, Avraham Ben Meir (a moshav member, former director-general of the Ministry of Agriculture--"he can be an excellent minister of agriculture"), or Yosqe Yahalom from Kevutzat Kineret, or Mimi De Shalit ("he can be an excellent minister of tourism"), or Minister Israel Katz ("see how quietly he did great things in the social area") and, of course, some RAFI members, such as Yigal Hurvitz and Zalman Shoval, and other people with whom the talks have not been completed.

This is the public, not left or right, but people of all shades capable, because of their special qualities, of guaranteeing that things can be changed.

"Dayan Will Draw Votes Mainly From the Alignment"

At this stage Dayan is not talking about an "alternative to the government." On the contrary, he aims "only" toward a faction in the Knesset, but a faction that will not necessarily see joining the coalition as the most important thing and

will use its parliamentary force to support everything that, according to it, serves the people, even if it is not popular (such as "economic restrictions"). Dayan promises that the decisions of such a faction will be made only according to one criterion: What is good for the state.

At first, when the talks about Dayan's list began to convince the people that, indeed, his intentions were serious (the turn occurred with the departure of RAFI headed by Yigal Hurvitz from the Likud), a slight trembling gripped the Likud. But when the first tremor passed, many people began to be convinced that in the present circumstances this was not such a bad idea, because, they said, "Dayan will draw his votes mainly from the Alignment, or from those that without him would have come from the DMC and even from the Likud directly to the Alignment."

Thus, the Alignment is going out to the election battle, having to face both fronts--Begin and Dayan--simultaneously.

"I will go out to battle," Prime Minister Menahem Begin promised Likud ministers and activists this week, when they came to urge him to join the battle actively.

Of course, it will be interesting to read the polls in the next few days. Thus far the Alignment has enjoyed the advantage of a tactical exercise without troops. The government continued to gnaw at its image and did nothing to attack the Alignment, whereas Dayan assumed the position of waiting. It is reasonable to suppose that, if Begin is now talking about going out to battle, he will, first of all, try to convince the "street" that the same brainwashing that the Alignment succeeded in doing to the nation, owing to which many turned their backs on the Likud, has no basis, because, after all, the Likud government has achievements to its credit. He will also try to convince many people that, not only peace with Egypt was attained, but Israel's security situation has improved, settlement (in Judea and Samaria, as well as in the Galilee and the desert) has expanded, social progress has begun, free education was provided, the rehabilitation of neighborhoods has begun ("perhaps not enough, but quite a lot has been done") and the condition of the individual does not justify the "crying" heard even from the satisfied strata.

Burg to Druqman: "Will You Succeed More on the Outside?"

There is no knowing if within a relatively short period it will be possible to make significant changes in public opinion and to plant new hopes in a big camp of disappointed people, but one thing is clear: The Alignment will have to strain its imagination in order to preserve its heretofore conquests.

To the credit of the Alignment it should be stated that its leader, Knesset member Shimon Peres, succeeded in turning it into a big and unified camp and, most importantly, a camp confident of its strength. In contrast to this, the gnawing in the Likud is visible and the NRP is threatened with defeat.

As the first battle cries are heard, it is still difficult to evaluate the developments accurately. For example, if the NRP does not succeed in convincing the Eytanin group headed by Knesset member Hayim Druqman to remain in the NRP, perhaps this party will lend its hand to raising the minimum percentage to 2½. In that

case not only Druqman will have to think hard if it is worthwhile for him to endanger himself in the adventure of a separate run. Other "fragments" will also be required to give thought to this. Dr Burg, who in the meantime reached an agreement with Hemez and Ben-Meir, explained to Druqman: Politics is influence and power. Influence can be exerted in the government, not outside of it. Apart from this, for what will Eytanim fight? For settlement? (Druqman explained that giving up Yamit and not adopting the law of the Golan Heights influenced his reserved approach to the NRP). "Will you succeed more on the outside?" asked Burg. "After all, during the election campaign the proponents of continued settlement will fight over the same votes--the Likud, the NRP, Rabbi Kahana, Eytanim and also Dayan..."

This is only one example of the lack of clarity of the political picture. What will the strength of the NRP be? How will Dayan's list seem when it is completed? Who will be the other elements that will join the campaign (for example, Shmuel Tamir's hesitation evokes second thoughts about him in the Likud--if, indeed, he "belongs" to it)? And who knows, perhaps after Shimon Peres announces his leading crew the first casualties will drop out and cross the lines, even to Moshe Dayan?

Therefore, right now it is difficult to evaluate the results of the battle. The true war has not begun yet.

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CSO: 4805

NEW FORMULATION OF DAYAN'S JERUSALEM PLANK REPORTED

TA311551 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 31 Mar 81 p 4

[Article by Bina Barzel: "A New Formulation to the Jerusalem Plank of the Dayan List"]

[Text] Following the fierce opposition arising from among Dayan's Rafi partners, headed by Yiga'el Hurvitz, to the initial formulation of the Jerusalem plank in Dayan's political platform, the Dayan lists' platform committee has provided a new formulation of this plank. The following formulation is suggested with Dayan's approval:

A. Sovereignty

The permanent status of Jerusalem is as determined in the basic law; the Knesset. Due to Jerusalem's special status Israel will aim at reaching a suitable possibly even unconventional agreement to the Christians and Muslims.

B. The Municipality

The municipality will be organized in such a manner as to allow appropriate representation to the various communities living in Jerusalem and independent handling of the affairs of the'r quarters.

C. The Holy Places

These will be under the administrative authority of the various communities. Israel will guarantee freedom of access to Jerusalem and the holy places located in Jerusalem and its surroundings.

The explanation that will be added to this plank: According to UN Security Council Resolution 242, during peace negotiations without any preconditions, Jordan will be able to raise the Jerusalem issue for discussion.

The Dayan list members are now waiting for Rafi leaders' reaction to the new formulation which will be presented to the participants in the Bama Convention this Saturday. Dayan will appear at this convention and will announce the establishment of his list, if he indeed decides to run in the Knesset elections.

PAPER REPORTS SECRET DAYAN-PERES AGREEMENT

TA031109 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Apr 81 pp 1, 2

[Yig'al Laviv report: "Agreement on Dayan Joining Peres Government After Elections"]

[Text] In a number of meetings held in recent weeks between Labor Party chairman Shim'on Peres and MK Moshe Dayan--some of them with the participation of a third party--agreement was reached on a coordination of stands between the two before and after the elections. This is reported by sources close to the two personages; these sources also participated in some of the talks. Originally there was even agreement on Dayan's joining the Alignment in a respectable place on the Knesset list, and the agreement of the Labor Party's leaders was obtained for this move; however, the idea was dropped because of an ultimatum issued by Mapam and the Adhut Ha'avoda faction. Knesset member Dayan last night vehemently denied the existence of any contacts or agreement.

Following the failure of the plan to have Dayan join the Alignment list, he and Peres reached full agreement on the following points:

--The two will not attack each other in the campaign and will try to prevent their lists from doing so, too.

--The list of candidates on Dayan's list was agreed upon by him and Peres together. Several of the potential candidates sought the Labor Party chairman's opinion before giving Dayan their reply. Peres recommended they join the Dayan list because he regards anyone on the new list as "a paratrooper operating behind enemy lines."

--Dayan undertook that under no circumstances will he support a Likud government, and that even if the Alignment does not for any reason co-opt him into the coalition he will form a loyal opposition.

--Peres undertook to bring about Dayan's appointment as minister for autonomy affairs, and that his government will act in line with Dayan's plan, while setting aside the Jordanian option.

--The two agreed that the preferred candidate for the finance portfolio must not have any party roots. It was agreed that top priority will go to Professor Hayim Ben-Shahar, followed by [former Bank of Israel Governor] Moshe Zanbar.

--Dayan said his list would include the following persons: Lawyer Ram Qaspi, Dr Manfred Grestenfeld (a U.S. economist, founder of the National Consultants Firm), Herzl Shafir, Lawyer Bo'az Nahir, as well as persons who have already declared that they would join, such as Mordekhay Ben-Porat and La'am faction members.

These same sources add that in the wake of the agreement, Peres worked to torpedo the appointment of Ya'akov Levinson as finance minister. Now he is pressing Professor Ben-Shahar to accept the post.

Behind the curtains of the talks various Israeli tycoons were active, as well as the heads of Bank Le'umi and the Discount Bank, who exerted pressure for the torpedoing of the Levinson candidacy and for a Peres-Dayan alliance. A key role in the pressure campaign was played by contributors to "ALEF" [Hebrew acronym for citizens for Peres], the body that was set up without direct connection to the Alignment's institutions.

Lawyer Ram Qaspi confirmed that after he was approached by Dayan to appear on his list, he consulted with Shim'on Peres. He refused to divulge what Peres said. Alignment spokesman Yosi Beilin said that the entire story is incorrect, since he would have known had any Peres-Dayan talks been held.

The sources noted that the rift between Dayan and Yiga'el Hurvitz stems from the former's refusal to view the latter as a candidate for the finance portfolio. Dayan believes that Hurvitz failed in this post and that investors would not be able to be recruited were he to become finance minister. Dayan expects that the new government will issue a call to the Jewish people to raise \$3 billion to ensure the country's survival. Hurvitz is not suitable for this task, since he has no linguistic abilities and has no ties with donors. On the other hand, Professor Ben-Shahar proved himself in the fund-raising sphere as President of Tel Aviv University, and he recently succeeded in persuading the President of the Occidental Company, Armand (Hammer), to finance huge studies in the field of joint energy resources in the Israeli-Egyptian-Saudi triangle.

Asked to comment on this report, Mr Moshe Dayan told this correspondent: "I did not meet with Peres even once; neither directly nor indirectly. Therefore, the entire rest of the report, to the effect that I spoke to him about coordination and that there was an agreement between us on appointments before and after the elections, is groundless nonsense."

Mr Dayan said he has no information on what Shim'on Peres wanted to do in his party, or whether Mapam and Ahdut Ha'avoda had issued an ultimatum. That question, he said, should be put to Mr Peres. Regarding the names mentioned as being on Dayan's list, Dayan said that it is true that both Qaspi and Dr Grestenfeld are on the list, although things were not yet clear regarding Herzl Shafir--but none of this had any connection with the talks that did not take place with Mr Peres. Knesset member Peres could not be reached last night for comment.

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PAPER ON PERES' MEETINGS ON 'SAUDI OPTION'

TA221119 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 22 Mar 81 pp 1, 7

[Article by Yesha'yahu Ben-Porat, Yohanan Lahav, Arye Tzimuqi and Bina Barzel:
 "The Incorporation of Saudi Arabia in the Peace Negotiations--in Peres' Talks with
 the King of Morocco and Husayn's Brother"]

[Excerpt] Saudi Arabia is apparently the key country standing at the center of the new political program secretly being worked out. Its main aspects were discussed, inter alia, in talks Shim'on Peres held last week in Morocco and England. This was reported last night by Western circles which initiated and made possible the meeting between the Labor Party chairman and King Hassan II of Morocco.

The political moral to be drawn from these talks, in the view of the above circles, is that, in some way, the "Saudi option" may be more practical and capable of being implemented than is the "Jordanian option," without there being any contradiction between the two. This view is based on the assumption--prevalent in various Arab capitals, including Rabat, the capital of Morocco--that Saudi Arabia is prepared, in principle, to be a direct partner in negotiations with Israel on a new, broader basis than that determined at the Camp David negotiations.

As far as can be seen, the intention is to incorporate Saudi Arabia, Jordan and, under certain conditions, Iraq, too, in negotiations in which only Israel, Egypt and the United States have so far participated. However, in order to maintain this alternative framework, Saudi Arabia is demanding that the Camp David agreements be replaced by another agreement to be achieved with the agreement of Egypt, Israel and the United States.

In this connection, it is pointed out that the leadership of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq are now united both in their willingness to solve the Palestinian problem without the participation of the PLO and in their desire to repel the influence of the Soviet Union in the area. Saudi Arabia has also expressed its willingness to take an active part in finding an agreeable solution to the problem of Jerusalem.

This morning Labor Party circles refused to confirm these assumptions. However, they did comment that the party's chairman returned "encouraged" from his talks abroad held last week.

BELIEF IN PERMANENT PEACE WITH EGYPT NOTED

TA181116 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Mar 81 p 4

[Pori Public Opinion Poll: "Majority of Public Believes That the Agreement with Egypt Will Bring Permanent Peace"]

[Text] Three years after the signing of the peace agreement with Egypt at Camp David [as published], the majority of the public has a qualified belief that the peace treaty will lead to permanent peace with Egypt. At the same time, most of the public believes there has been an improvement in Israel's situation in the wake of the signing of the peace agreement. This emerges from a countrywide public opinion poll conducted this month by the Pori Institute; the poll was commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

Question: "This month is the 3d anniversary of the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt at Camp David [as published]. Do you believe today that the peace treaty with Egypt will bring permanent peace with Egypt?" To this question, 40.1 percent said they have "some faith" and 15.4 percent said they have "great faith" in this, so that 55.5 percent of the public believes in the peace treaty. Another 22.6 percent said they have "little faith" and 17.2 percent said they have no faith at all in this, so that 39.8 percent do not believe so much that the peace treaty will lead to permanent peace with Egypt. The other 4.7 percent had no opinion one way or the other.

Question: "In your view, has there or has there not been an improvement in Israel's situation in the wake of the signing of the peace treaty?" To this question, 50.3 percent said they thought there has been an improvement, as against 34.6 percent who thought that there had not been such an improvement. Another 6.3 percent said there had been a security but not an economic improvement. The remaining 7 percent said they "do not know."

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GOVERNMENT APPEALS TO EGYPT ON PLO BUREAU

TA161208 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 16 Mar 81 pp 1, 15

[Article by Ya'aqov Erez: "Israel to Egypt: A PLO Bureau is Active in al-'Arish"]

[Text] Israel has appealed to Egypt several times with a request that Egypt should examine the activity of PLO personnel in al-'Arish. Senior security sources in Israel report that a PLO bureau has been opened recently in al-'Arish which, inter alia, helps terrorists who are trying to infiltrate from Egyptian territory to the Gaza Strip.

Sources from the joint Israel-Egypt military committee have said that it has emerged from examinations that the reference is not to a PLO bureau, but an apartment in al-'Arish whose owners are helping terrorists without the knowledge of the Egyptian authorities.

Over the last 3 weeks three requests to Egypt to examine these issues have been passed on via the joint military committee. Sources in the committee did not describe these appeals as complaints.

According to them, Egypt is not helping the PLO activity and the Cairo authorities have not permitted the opening of a PLO bureau in al-'Arish.

In contrast to this, senior security sources indicate a link between terrorist activity in the Gaza Strip and Egypt--although without the knowledge of the Egyptian authorities. Various weapons have also been found in the Gaza Strip recently, which were smuggled in from Egypt. These sources say that the fact of the border between Israel and Egypt having become a peaceful one makes it easier for PLO personnel to infiltrate the Gaza Strip.

According to them, a PLO bureau has actually been opened in al-'Arish with the approval of the Egyptian authorities, as a branch of the bureau working out of ('Adali) Street in Cairo (not far from the main synagogue there).

In reply to a question by the MA'ARIV correspondent, it was reported last night that no replies had yet been received from Egypt to the appeals which also included such precise details as the site of the apartment from which the PLO personnel are working in al-'Arish and so on. The Egyptians promised that they would take firm action on this matter and would prevent the bureau from working. It has been learned that, according to sources in the military committee, the Egyptians have taken several steps aimed at preventing the possibility of infiltration into the Gaza Strip area.

'DAVAR' ON PROSPECTS FOR PEACE TREATY

TA011628 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 1 Apr 81 p 5

[Yosef Pri'el commentary: "The Year of Decision"]

[Text] There can no longer be any doubt that where the peace with Israel is concerned, nothing in Egypt happens by accident; everything is directed from above. Straight from above: from the office of President Anwar al-Sadat. However, anyone looking for logic in the motives or timing of this direction will find it difficult to discover any common denominator among the various manifestations; what he can expect to find is surprises every day.

Precisely last Thursday [26 Mar]--the second anniversary of the signing of the peace treaty--al-Sadat decided to hold, whether by coincidence or not, the largest military exercise of Egypt's air defense system. Accompanied by the entire governmental hierarchy, the present went to view the firing of missiles--filmed for television--this time in the western desert, on the Libyan front. That evening Egyptian television opened its newscast with extensive coverage of the exercise. Immediately thereafter it broadcast an extensive report marking the date--2 years since the peace treaty--and announced the broadcast of a special newsreel on the subject which would come on following the regular news.

In that 30-minute film, the Egyptians reconstructed the peace process in a manner that was quite one-sided. Al-Sadat's achievements were stressed, particularly the return of Sinai and the outfields to Egypt. From the film one could form the impression that Egypt had made peace with itself, since Israel's part in the process went virtually unmentioned.

The Egyptian press also took note of the day, albeit in a different tone. AL-JUMHURIYAH, terming it "'al-Arish Day," wrote that this was the day "that shattered the Zionist illusion about its intentions of annexing Sinai." AL-AHRAM wrote that the peace had proved its usefulness: Israel had withdrawn from the territories and was returning them to Egypt, which was helping buttress the Egyptian economy and ameliorate the economic situation of the masses of the Egyptian people.

Anyone seeking further proof that all was being dictated from above could find it in the whole process of ratification of the reciprocal agreements that were signed as part of the normalization process. The Egyptians had postponed their ratification, claiming that the discussions have been protracted. But last week, when

Israeli Industry Minister Gid'on Pat visited Egypt--even before he had managed to put forward Israel's request for an acceleration of the ratification of the trade agreement--his Egyptian counterparts announced with a fanfare that it would be ratified within 5 days. The matter was brought before the people's assembly two days ago. The speaker of the Egyptian parliament allowed the opposition representatives to put forward in a demonstrative manner all their arguments against the peace, and then quickly had the agreements ratified by majority vote. Even though the parliamentary delegates' applause went to the government speakers who favored the agreement, it was evident from the press gallery that the representatives showed no little sympathy for the remarks of Ibrahim (Shukri), of the opposition, even though they voted in favor of the agreement.

In Egypt the peace agreement is today a fait accompli, but it is a fait accompli with conditions. The Egyptians are trying to latch on to every little report from Israel on the possible postponement of the Sinai withdrawal date--because of the Rafah approaches problems--in order to prove that Israel does not intend to adhere to the peace agreement. The respite that has now been brought about by the Israeli elections is being utilized by the Egyptians to maintain ties with Israel at a low profile. They are enabling the trade and tourism ties between the two countries (that is, mainly between Israel and Egypt, hardly at all the opposite) to develop at a rapid pace. As far as they are concerned, if good business deals can be made at this stage, it is worth making them, even if they are being made with Israelis.

No one in Cairo is talking about the autonomy negotiations any longer. The Egyptians prefer to keep the Palestinian question simmering, not only until after the Israeli elections, but mainly until after the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai next April. For al-Sadat what is most important now is to complete the process of the "return of the lands," and all his actions concerning realization of the peace with Israel are apparently motivated by this goal. Egypt seeks to complete the process which involves it directly with the best foot forward, and then move into a confrontation regarding the next stage. How this will affect the growing peace relations on the ground is hard to know.

The Israeli embassy staff in Cairo believes that what has been done cannot be undone. The peace is a fact to which the Egyptians are gradually growing accustomed. The more time passes, the more the Egyptians are imbued with a sense of the positive aspects of the peace. The severing of this tie, it is believed in the Israeli embassy in Cairo, would be an artificial move, and it is highly unlikely it could be effected.

They may be forgetting that in Egypt everything is dictated from above, and a breaking off of ties could result from one single order. The Egyptians already have plenty of experience in severing and renewing relations and pacts with the best of their friends. The treaties with Syria, with Russia and with Libya are as if they never happened. The guiding hand, with the help of its massive propaganda means, could continue this process or it could terminate it. It appears that the 3d year of the peace agreement will be the decisive year as regards the future of the relations between Israel and Egypt. The course we follow this year will determine the future of the peace that is being woven between the two peoples.

COMMENTATOR ANALYZES PROSPECTS OF LIKUD, ALIGNMENT

TA271524 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Mar 81 p 18

[Article by Yosef Harif: "Shim'on, Forget About All Your Trips--Your Moroccans Are In Dimona"]

[Excerpts] No longer is anybody impressed about trips to Morocco, especially not after Moshe Dayan's illustrating descriptions [in his recently published book] of his own visits there down to the most irrelevant detail such as the color of the soap, the tiles and the per'umes in the bathroom.

Another bright idea which cropped up this week--"the Saudi option" is not very impressive either, since such an idea is usually extinguished as soon as it becomes public knowledge. What is new about the need or the benefit of creating a political alignment that will include Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the United States? In this case--publishing this original idea about the need to negotiate with Saudi Arabia--"the prime minister's office" cannot be charged with leaking the story....

However, one may understand how such "tricks" are conceived: It is as simple as this; there are no other issues to refer to in the basic argument that should be conducted between the opposition and the government in their struggle to rule.

In a television program this week, the Labor Party chairman was asked point-blank about his party's concrete proposals on the economic issue, that is, other than its banal criticism of Aridor's policy. Peres' reply essentially was that he was for reducing imports and giving incentives to exports and that he had been against the 'Etzyoni Committee [which examined the wages and status of the teachers] from the outset. Yes, this week he also met with Naftali Blumenthal, Professor Mordekhay Ben-Shahar and Gad Ya'aqobi [members of the Alignment's economic team]....

And what about the political sphere? According to his own testimony, the Labor Party chairman himself already feels that the word "option" provokes smiles. When one says "the Middle East chapter is now opening" (why precisely "now"?--one ain't said nothing yet. If it is true that the next 4 years will be very decisive years--and this is undoubtedly true--then there is all the more reason for the alignment to state clearly its proposed settlement which will also appeal to Jordan, the Palestinians and...Saudi Arabia. This secret is being kept more tightly than the visit to Morocco and the meeting with King Husayn's brother in London.

There is no room to sneer at the untiring efforts of such a respected, prestigious and successful party as the Labor Party on such a delicate and complex matter as the political issue in the confusing Middle East. On the contrary, the party and its leader should be lauded for their intellectual efforts to divert from the norms. However, one should wonder at them for their pretentiousness and pretense that the solution is, as it were, in their pocket: "The Jordanian option" or its new edition, "The Saudi option."

In any case, before the telephone call is received from Riyadh or Amman the Alignment should concretely spell out its proposed solution. Peres cryptically replied that he could certainly not divulge what he had heard, he added that he was merely optimistic--and thus managed to keep us all in "suspense."

However, let us forget about what he heard and let us hear what he is saying. What is the Alignment proposing on the political sphere that the Likud (or Moshe Dayan) are not? Well, Peres had some "news" this time: Conducting simultaneous negotiations, both with Egypt and with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. However, this original idea will not lead him to power. If Jordan and Saudi Arabia will show readiness to go ahead with such a notion based on the hope the Alignment will implant in the public that these countries will be ready to talk to Peres, the results will be counterproductive. Peres will have to state what he will give to Saudi Arabia since Saudi Arabia claims that the entire Holy City of Jerusalem and all the occupied lands are Arab territory and it will recruit the Arab world for a "jihad" to regain the territory.

It may certainly be assumed that Prime Minister Menahem Begin is very pleased about the tendency of the head of the opposition to focus the debate surrounding the 1981 elections on the political issue, as Peres has done so far. To wit, one of the Alignment's election campaign heads, MK Yosi Sarid, spectacularly declared (although he termed it as his "personal view") that he actually favors the establishment of a Palestinian state.

It seems that Peres will soon realize that he will have to bid farewell to Saudi Arabia and Morocco and return to "Dimona" (development town in the Negev largely inhabited by Jews of Moroccan extraction). After all, the pressing problems afflicting the public are not precisely within the political sphere since the government established peace with Egypt and its success in curbing terrorist activities are not negligible at all.

In sum, after the Moroccan adventure one has to return home, to daily mediocrity; not only to face the Likud but also the insides of the Alignment.

As the Labor Party chairman put it, he does not share the feeling that the party "has lost ground" since the impressive party convention. However, it is interesting to note that senior Labor Party functionaries have recently shown signs of insecurity. There is no longer talk about a landslide victory of more than 50 mandates and almost every time a reference is made to power one discerns a note of caution: "If we rise to power."

This "if" comprises several parts. First of all, if Moshe Dayan runs for election on an independent list. Before his departure abroad, Dayan actually strengthened the impression that he was determined to run. However, this possibility should be

regarded with a grain of doubt. Under current circumstances, at least the Rafi faction of his list is not yet guaranteed; MK Yitzhaq Peretz has openly stated so and Yiga'el Hurvitz has almost said the same. In any case, upon departing following a talk with Dayan which lasted 90 minutes, Hurvitz had not given a positive response.

The second "if" obviously depends on the Likud's ability to constantly accelerate its recovery.

Undoubtedly, Shim'on Peres has made a somewhat "private" contribution to the Likud's process of recovery. To wit, his negotiations with Ya'aqov Levinson [mentioned as a possible finance minister in an Alignment-led government], decisions which stirred ferment against him even among his close associates, statements that began eroding the "myth" that the Alignment can succeed where the Likud failed--all these caused the Alignment "to lose ground."

However, whoever wants to predict the results of the June elections based on present circumstances may be in for a disappointment. An estimate would be too complicated because there is a large number of unknown facts. For example, if Moshe Dayan does not run on an independent list, a figure such as Yitzhaq Rabin will be deprived of the means to have his wishes fulfilled by the Alignment--both, regarding himself and the nine safe places he demands for his people in the Knesset list. If Peres allows himself to ignore Yitzhaq Rabin at this point, all the more so if he finds that the "Jordanian option" no longer exists.

If, on the one hand, Peres refrains from making more mistakes and, on the other hand, the Likud's rise is curbed mainly due to political stability and the favorable atmosphere Finance Minister Yoram Aridor has been managing to instill--even at the cost of postponing economic difficulties--the Alignment's position may stabilize.

In any case, before May--a few weeks before the fateful election day--it will be difficult to make a realistic assessment of their outcome.

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COMMENTARY ON U.S. STRATEGIC PERCEPTION OF ISRAEL

TA181236 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Mar 81 p 5

[Hagay Eshed commentary: "The First Quarrel in the Honeymoon"]

[Excerpts] If we assume that the new U.S. administration intends to be taken seriously when it tells Israel that it is a "strategic asset" and therefore must be strong, the conclusion is unavoidable that this administration is still amateurish, rash and hasty, shows signs of "playing the big man," and does not know how to proceed with wisdom and good sense. Or perhaps the senior staff in the State Department and the Pentagon is still trying to work in the spirit of the previous administration, by scuttling the intentions of their new masters. One way or the other, the result is the same. That is, we are in the midst, or perhaps only at the beginning, of a first quarrel in the honeymoon between the beloved and the delightful, as they have declared themselves: the old Israeli government and the new U.S. administration. How this quarrel will develop, what residue it will leave, it is still too early to tell. The beginning, at all events, does not augur well. The new Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, is coming across as an energetic activist, anxious for quick deeds and seeking immediate results. If Saudi Arabia is to be strengthened, let it be done at once. If all its arms requests are to be acceded to, then begin at the end and give it the best, in the largest quantity, in the shortest time.

And what about Israel? It too will get something, but it is not first in line and it does not have the keys to the kingdom. The monetary compensation offered it is stingy in the extreme, both as regards the size of the credit and its conditions, and in contrast to what Egypt was given, at a time when its economy is on the upswing, while Israel's economic situation has grown worse. Israel is being thrown a small and thin military bone, one that is liable to stick in its economic throat--and Foreign Minister Shamir has already asserted in the Knesset, on the day before yesterday, that economically Israel will not be able to cope with Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab states in an arms race. The United States is accelerating this arms race tremendously, without speaking to Israel about it, as though there were no need to consult with Israel or even to inform it in advance of the administration's intentions on matters that endanger Israel's security and undermine its economy.

On the face of it, the new U.S. strategy in the Middle East may be termed one of parallel lines. One line of defense crosses the Persian Gulf, and its central

hinge is Saudi Arabia. A second line, based on Egypt, is intended to be an operational base of the defense of the Persian Gulf, as well as for operations in Africa, the Red Sea arena and the Arabian Peninsula and its beaches. Israel has the nature of a point, not a line. Perhaps it can join Egypt (even that is doubtful) as a kind of reserve rear base. The declared aim is to prevent a collision between these two parallel lines, all of which lead to one objective only: containment of Soviet expansion.

The logic of this strategy of the parallel lines lies in its ability to prevent their colliding and getting entangled with each other. But in reality the opposite is happening. If one wants to keep things calm and build trust, one must not at the same time cause anxiety. Anxiety is contagious. The new administration is trying to make Saudi Arabia trustful, though it is not yet certain it has succeeded in this. What is clear is that it has already succeeded in causing apprehension and anxiety in Israel, both within the government itself and among the opposition and across the whole range of public opinion.

The Likud government continues to be amateurish and clumsy, even after 4 years: the more so when it is involved with a new administration which is both amateurish and hyperactive. The Israeli government had two possible information lines of action. It could have opposed the very policy of unlimited military supplies to Saudi Arabia--the quantity, quality and delivery dates of these most sophisticated and most dangerous of weapons. To that end, it could have enlisted the aid of some of the Senate and of American public opinion, which oppose the deal with the Saudis either out of friendship for Israel, or with an eye on the lesson of the Iranian failure and out of opposition to an unrestricted arms race in the Middle East. Or, the government could have adopted an information line which would not have come out against the arms race as such, but would have warned about its risks, demanded that it be gradual, limited and more balanced, and explained in detail what Israel regards as the necessary minimum in economic and military aid in order to offset the risks and in order to prevent a danger-fraught Israeli economic collapse and military enfeeblement.

If Israel is a strategic asset, it must be strong. The new administration is acting in a self-contradictory manner. It is making declarations of love and pledges of faithfulness to Israel but acting in the opposite way behind Israel's back. What was not done by the decision to supply the offensive equipment to the Saudis' F-15's and by the announcement of the miserable compensation Israel is to get as a supposed quid pro quo, was done by the reports on the supply of the AWACS planes.

The honeymoon between Israel and the new administration in Washington has been shattered. The quarrel has erupted in full force. What remains is to see how it develops.

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' ON U.S. MIDEAST STRATEGY

TA201151 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Mar 81 p 9

[U.S. Correspondent Gid'on Samet commentary: "Israel and the U.S. Steamroller"]

[Text] Strange things emerge as the new U.S. Middle East and Persian Gulf strategy takes shape. The first is that, in fact, it still does not exist in the sense of being an organized plan. It transpires that the administration has not yet consolidated its thoughts beyond the phase of words rife with rhetoric on warding off the Soviet threat to the region. The second is that Israel is the only country, perhaps with the exception of Oman, which is prepared to incorporate into this strategy--and declares this publicly--as well as provide the United States with bases. But not only is it the main loser in this deal so far, but it is also the country that least prepared itself for the new reality, more so than any other candidate [for incorporation in the new U.S. strategy].

Israel is not even listening properly to what Washington has been telling it. This week, Ambassador Sam Lewis was forced to embarrass the foreign minister when refuting, with the help of proof clearly written on paper, Mr Shamir's statement made to the cabinet that the supply of AWACS [to Saudi Arabia] was not mentioned during his talks in Washington.

The third thing is, again, that the prospective allies have not yet consented at all. The wedding canopy has been set without the bride and groom saying "I do."

The argument is as follows: The idea of establishing a network of bases (or as the United States prefers to call them, because of Muslim sensitivity, auxiliary and access facilities) is still very much in the theoretical and preliminary stages; and the translation of the new Washington approach toward dealing with the regional and world problems is, in general, in terms of West versus East.

The new administration--and this pertains to all the top echelon protagonists--is overflowing with ideas and proposals for change. However, only some of them materialize, and even those that do are ultimately an extremely watered down version of the original. "I suggest that Israel take the idea of the strategic alignment with a grain of salt," an official who has previously seen many plans come and go stated. He also views the thought of establishing a real pact around the Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel axis as [sentence incomplete due to misprint as published].

The more time passes and, as one of its results, the closer Haig's visit to the region comes, the more the initial thoughts are being run through the mills of the well-oiled U.S. bureaucratic machine. This injects into them, through its working papers and recommendations, a more balanced and cooler wind.

For example: There still are no signs that the Muslim countries would want to be part of an overt American deployment. There is no real evidence to prove that it would be possible to make progress in contacts with those countries while neglecting the Palestinian issue. This is according to senior administration spokesmen, who thus express a kind of forecast with the intention of actually bringing it about, despite everything.

Some have described the U.S. moves as placing the cart before the horse. This is the view regarding the influx of arms or plans to the countries in this region before it is clear what the concrete goal is and from where evil will emerge--not in the simplistic sense that sees everything as stemming from the Soviet Union's notorious wickedness, but in the simple tactical sense of planning defense against a tangible threat in the future.

The Israeli chain is easily linked to the misty terms employed by the administration. What does Alexander Haig actually mean when he says (before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2 days ago): "We recognize Israel's importance in developing our regional strategic development. Israel constitutes an important deterrent in the region and can, indeed, play a central role in withstanding the most serious threats emanating from the Soviet Union." Is Israel important for the defense of the Persian Gulf? Who would venture to imagine cooperation offered by Israel in time of military activity there? Or does the Secretary of State mean that Israel's role, as some officials have often said, would be to ward off possible Soviet aggression through Syria and be a kind of rear column in the region? We still do not have answers to these and many other questions.

Instead, while Washington is trying to finish up the puzzle of its strategy, new heavy-weight questions emerge. The most important for us is: What would happen to Israel on the way to realizing the American dream? The strategic asset (which someone has called a pain in the neck) has, in the past 2 months, been smashed by the administration steamroller; and both times it was when the United States tried to strengthen its hold within the bounds of another asset, Saudi Arabia, which is more important for it. The Israeli question can also be presented thus: What is the limit of Saudi demands (and other countries to follow) that the United States would feel obligated to comply with before they constitute a really serious blow to the Israeli interests?

Would the Saudi demand for expeditious handling of the Palestinian issue in accordance with the Riyadh spirit be less obligating than a request for equipment? Would the U.S. arguments favoring the implementation of the arms deal--strengthening the royal family (the Palestinians are a fermenting element): "If they do not get from us they will get from others" (the alternative presented by the European initiative) and the like--not hold just as well?

The demand that Saudi Arabia provide political recompense for Israel's de facto silence regarding the deal (by way of ceasing to subvert the peace treaty) well demonstrates in its impracticability Jerusalem's position. Jerusalem is at present

facing a political formula described in high-and-mighty flowery terms full of praise for it but is left with its mouth agape hanging in mid-air. Tell Jerusalem that it is "a strategic asset" and you have numbed its senses, one of which--we all know--is the sense of hearing.

The near-automatic readiness of Washington to satisfy Saudi Arabia began to raise skepticism not only among the Jews in Israel, but also among orientalists and political analysts. The questions all add up to an increasingly fat list: Is the description of Saudi Arabia as "moderate" correct (not only as far as Israel is concerned) or is it maybe another cliché that has not been exhaustively examined? Is it correct to embrace a policy of recoiling in the face of every Saudi request? Would it not be better to hold it more at bay and find out that the United States is a necessary prop for it rather than the opposite?

Orientalist (Jibi Kali) wrote about it in his book "Arabia, The Gulf and the West" that has recently won much publicity: "The only achievement the repetition of the doctrine of a common U.S.-Saudi interest has scored is to convince the Middle Eastern oil producers that the West needs them just as much--or even more--than they need the West and thus increase their self-confidence and their indulging in an illusion regarding their prowess."

In times of a flood of verbiage, plans and investments around the U.S. deployment along the Gulf, these words of warning together with the U.S. official's proposal to take the administration's intentions with a grain of salt all sing the same tune. Another observer said that pouring the money into the countries of the region should not be mistaken for a well-planned policy of clear goals. Under these circumstances it seems that as long as it is not certain that the U.S. strategic wonder will take place, Israel had better concentrate on decreasing the damage to itself.

So far, perhaps under unavoidable circumstances, Israel has paid the price, as a sort of advance payment for the coveted strategic incorporation. Now it would be advisable to wait and see at least the fringes of the merchandise. And, in the meantime, it is necessary to examine the U.S. moves carefully. It would be worthwhile also to listen with great attention. Last time, when we did not do so, some surveillance aircraft silently passed over our heads en route to their Saudi destination.

Next week these assignments will be thrust en bloc on the delegation headed by Mordekhay Tzipori that will arrive in Washington to hold talks. After the previous round of talks at the end of last year, one observer could not hold up his comments. He said that the talks fluctuated between "a disgrace and shamefulness."

CSO: 4805

ISRAELI COMMENTATOR ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH U.S.

TA031238 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Apr 81 p 13

[A. Schweitzer commentary: "Under the Sign of Reciprocity"]

[Excerpt] One may define simply the shift taking place among the governing circles in the United States--which seems to agree with Israel's own appraisal--by saying that relations between the two countries will be based on reciprocity, instead of the unidirectional nature they had until now. Henceforth, it must be believed, while Israel will no longer encounter excessive difficulties in obtaining what it requires for its defense, it will, in return for this aid, be called on to supply services of a strategic nature which have not yet been spelled out precisely--this will, naturally, be done in the course of time--while the alignment in which it will be integrated will no longer be merely regional, but will assume a global character. That is, the thrust of this alignment is not directed against any of Israel's traditional enemies, but against the Soviet Union.

The relations between Israel and the Soviet Union have for most of the country's history fluctuated between bad and worse. However, until now this has been a tangential enmity, devoid of any direct military dimension. What is now involved--and it must be stressed that in this connection the Reagan administration acceded to Israel's appeals to view it as a strategic asset--is Israel's becoming part of a military alignment which has one objective: to deter, or should the need arise, to repulse any Soviet move--an invasion or a revolution in the region which would gain the assistance of a Soviet satellite--threatening a western foothold, and particularly oil. To stretch this notion as far as it can be stretched, Israel could be called on by a U.S. officer to activate the IDF or one of its branches in order to defend Kuwait against an invasion by Cuban and East German forces embarking from a base in South Yemen.

This notion may be fanciful, but it can make concrete the change that must be wrought, according to the new administration's conception, in the standing of the region's countries--including Israel--and in the essence of the military challenge they will face. Secretary of State Haig recently spoke of his intention to crystallize a consensus under U.S. auspices in the region. Ideally, this would mean that even if these countries did not become one another's allies, the advanced weaponry they possess would no longer be directed toward the traditional neighbor-foe, but would point eastward, and at longer ranges. Moreover, the armed forces would operate according to a joint strategy, the troops would be integrated within

a looser or tighter command framework, headed by a U.S. military figure, or someone acceptable to the United States and to the regional partners to the consensus.

It has already been noted that U.S. policy toward the region--its Mediterranean flank and its other, Persian Gulf, flank--is now in the process of preliminary formulation, this consisting of verification of political and military facts, their classification and the onset of their integration into a strategic picture. But whether the administration sticks to its ideas about the integration of forces, or makes do with a passive consensus in whose framework the U.S. would organize the region's defense through bilateral agreements between it and Israel on the one hand, and between it and the Arab states on the other, it is clear that the independence of Israel's defense policy, the IDF's objectives, its arming and training will all be affected. There will occur--at all events there will be required--a change reaching to the very heart of Israel's national existence. Without any hesitation one may term this change, which stems directly from Israel's being operatively perceived as a strategic asset, as the most revolutionary to occur since the establishment of the state.

In recent years there have been two instances when our heart's desires were fulfilled but we were not ready for it. The first time was when al-Sadat visited Israel: Israel still has not recovered from the shock of peace--and it makes no difference how many Israelis are visiting the land of the Nile. And now, as far as may be determined, we have not even begun to work out, even from the intellectual aspect, the political and military meaning of the United States' accession to Israel's desire to be part of a regional strategic alignment as an asset in the hands of the power brokers in the White House. In the meantime, Israel is happy that at least for the time being the United States has ceased pestering us about the Palestinian question, that military supplies are abundant, and that the atmosphere in Washington has changed (for the better) beyond recognition. But is it Israel's estimation that the new U.S. conception is in fact realistic? Is it desirable for us or not, and if it is, with what changes? Do we have even the beginning of an idea of what will be required of us in the political and military spheres if this conception is in fact put into operation by the United States?

There is no point in our frightening ourselves, but realism requires that we examine what is happening: the United States is seeking to shift relations with Israel onto the reciprocal plane, as is the custom between countries which have give-and-take relations. It is doing this according to its own interests, which are threatened in the region by, ultimately, the Soviet Union's global strength--not in Jordan, not in Egypt and not in Saudi Arabia. Is Israel ready to play in this league and by its rules? Does it have any choice? These are the fundamental questions that the government formed after the elections will have to consider and decide on.

CSO: 4805

CP LEADER WILNER INTERVIEWED

TA131535 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 13 Mar 81 pp 4, 11

[Interview with Rakah Secretary General MK Me'ir Wilner Upon His Return from the CPSU Conference by Dorit Gefen: "Readiness to Hold a Dialogue with any Israeli Party"]

[Excerpt] [Question] Both Rakah and yourself have been accorded almost exceptional treatment in the Soviet Union, if we take into account the size of the Rakah party and its very limited influence in Israel. Is it because of a personal relationship or due to the special esteem the Soviets feel for you?

[Wilner] It is the quality that matters, not the quantity. I cannot speak about the treatment of myself. We have asked for nothing. We arrived and they told me, you will be sitting at the presidium, and offered me the opportunity to make a speech at the conference. I think it stems from political considerations, to show world public opinion and public opinion in the Middle East, and to the Soviets too, that Israel is not just "the ruling circles and the annexationist policy," whatever we call it. Rather, there is another Israel, which is also concerned about Israel's interests. In our speech we have appeared as Israeli patriots and have presented the basically common interests of the people in Israel and the Arab peoples in the region and the national and social liberation movements in the world. At the conference it assumes a very tangible significance when representatives of the Arab Communist Parties, as well as noncommunist ones, such as the Syrian Ba'ath appear, and an Israeli representative appears and they say similar words. This reinforces both parties. This indicates that the people in Israel should not be treated as a monolithic bloc. I know that people here do not have high regard for what we are doing, but objectively this is very important.

[Question] Your speech would have appeared in the press even if you had appeared in some factory. Does not the fact that you have addressed the conference prove that you have been given special honor?

[Wilner] It may be because they know that here, in Israel, it is very difficult to maintain a Communist Party. It is not just shouting slogans such as "away with imperialism." Here we have to face very hard debates. They know that we represent a different Israel. I do not know about a special treatment, and I do not like discussing personal affairs at all.

[Question] Have you heard any hints about the possibility of resuming relations [with the Soviet Union] on any level?

[Wilner] This issue was not discussed this time. The only thing discussed was the international conference suggested by Brezhnev. The Soviets may be willing to resume certain ties in the course of such a process. In the meantime, however, there is no change in the direction of the peace process. On the contrary, there is a regression. In 1977 it appeared after the U.S.-Soviet agreement that some kind of shift might occur, but then the Camp David process came and that constituted a regression, of course...

[Question] To what extent did the conference refer to the change of regime in the United States, and especially to the new style of the administration leaders against the Soviet policy?

[Wilner] To the extent that it appeared in the conference, they apparently decided not to be carried away by the provocations and strong wording. Is that how state leaders speak? But this is the style. I do not doubt that the Soviet leadership decided not to be carried into this. They speak not only about Reagan but also about the nations. They have decided to speak matter-of-factly, and to point to the dangers to peace and to make proposals. No conference has ever been like this one, in which there were such detailed suggestions for each region. The watchword was: Let us sit down and talk. Brezhnev said: Why go into such immense expenses in the arms race. He said that this burden is also lying heavy on the Soviet Union. He made it clear, however, that the Soviet Union will not allow a one-sided military confrontation. Brezhnev said that if one is tempted to believe that one may win, this is a dangerous lunacy. There will be no winners.

[Question] What place did the Middle East occupy in the speech?

[Wilner] The Middle East took a relatively important place, even larger than that of the Iraq-Iran war or China.

[Question] How does al-Sadat's position look?

[Wilner] Al-Sadat has burned all the bridges. He is more American than the Americans. But there will be changes in Egypt too. This is not a regime based on the people's will.

[Question] Did the conference participants, particularly the Soviets take interest in the elections campaign in Israel? Do the Soviets perceive any difference between the Likud and the Alignment? Or perhaps it does not make any difference to them as long as Rakah would win?

[Wilner] There was considerable interest in the elections, not only by the Soviets. It does arouse interest among the people. They even wanted to know what the chances were and what might happen. No. They do not think there will be a socialist revolution in Israel. But we have already held the balance in the past. At the time of Rabin's cabinet it was our votes that were decisive and this may happen now too. Obviously, we favor the toppling of the Likud government first of all. We must get rid of this trouble, there is no doubt about that. This is a disaster from all points of view.

We do not, however, regard the Alignment government, if one is formed, as the solution or as an alternative. The reason is simple. In the Alignment it is the Labor Party's political program that outlines the policy, and it does not in any way differ. We see no change in it. Peres and his colleagues want to get to power only because the public wants to replace the Likud, and not because they want to change the situation for the better. There is nothing new in the socio-economic sphere either.

[Question] I have a hypothetical, unrealistic but interesting question: Would the Rakah Party be willing to join an Alignment coalition under certain circumstances?

[Wilner] There was a situation like this in Sweden. The Socio-Democratic Party has a majority, together with the communists and the government was in power for several years, due to the communist support. This was done first and foremost in order to prevent the right wing from attaining power. However, there is a big "but" here. Israel is not Sweden. Please, understand me, it is not because we are "Stalinists" as they call us. It is absurd that they should call us this name. We are unbelievably flexible. For instance, when we initiated the idea of a peace movement conjointly with other parties, we were criticized by different circles in the Middle East who asked how we could cooperate with chauvinist circles and the like. But we have made an independent decision. There is an objective difference between Sweden and Israel. Sweden is conducting a neutral foreign policy, while we are marching on the vanguard of the strategic bloc against the Soviet Union. Begin and Shamir are competing over who would better serve the U.S. interests. But I am not ruling out such possibility altogether. Especially if the alternative is a Likud government. If Israel conducted a neutral policy we will have done something.

[Question] Does this mean a Soviet strategy?

[Wilner] No, an Israeli strategy. I am also critical of Mapam, which, at least by tacit agreement, accepts the fact that Israel should be a part of the U.S. military and political system, directed against the progressive countries with a socialist orientation, even in this region, and against the Soviet Union. Besides that, we obviously differ on the solution of the Israel-Arab conflict and the solution of the Palestinian problem.

We favor a state within the '67 borders and Mapam does not accept this. Mapam does not want Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights, even in the framework of a peace agreement. The same difference of opinion exists on Jerusalem, and Mapam wants to annex some territory here and there. Mapam does not recognize the Palestinians' right to an independent state.

CSO: 4805

WEST BANK COMMANDER VISITS TULKARM, JANIN

TA242046 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1850 GMT 24 Mar 81

[Text] Tulkarm, 24 Mar--Judea and Samaria governor Brig Gen Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer has granted 350,000 shekels for the development of the electricity grid in Tulkarm, and another 207,000 shekels for the paving of a new road in the town. The governor today visited Tulkarm and Janin, and was received by the mayors of the two towns, who explained to him the towns' problems.

In Janin, the governor spent a long time at the Hitin High School, spoke with the youths there, and promised to help all the teachers in the region by means of new wage increases. He also promised to grant 20,000 shekels for the paving of a road to the new school now under construction.

The governor also visited the Janin Chamber of Commerce, where he told the merchants to be meticulous in keeping books, as required by law. In his meeting with the mayor, the governor agreed to release two cars which were purchased by the municipality and then confiscated by the military government, because it had not approved their purchase in advance.

The coordinator of activities in the administered territories, Maj Gen Dani Mat, visited Nabulus, where he spoke with workers in various plants in the town. He spent time with workers in the local electricity company, and had a first-hand look at the progress being made in the installation of the new generators with the assistance of German experts. The ITIM correspondent has learned that Nabulus workers complained to the coordinator of activities about deficiencies in the municipal services being offered to the town's residents in view of the preoccupation of the mayor and his colleagues with political matters.

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS ALIGNMENT AHEAD

TA161408 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 16 Mar 81 pp 1, 15

["Smith Institute Election Poll: The Alignment Has the Upper Hand Over the Likud Among Jews"]

[Text] The first public opinion poll conducted by the Smith Institute since the official opening of the elections campaign shows that the alignment has an advantage of 21.5 percent over the Likud among the voting public.

In the poll, which was conducted from 1-10 March among a representative national sample including about 1,200 Jews with voting rights, the alignment received 41.5 percent and the Likud 20 percent of all votes.

However, since the poll conducted from 11 to 22 January (at the Likud's lowest point (after Yiga'el Hurvitz' resignation and the decision to hold new elections) there have been appreciable changes in the voters' opinions.

Date of Poll	Likud	Alignment	Religious Parties	Other Parties	Undecided
May 1979	26	33	13	8	20
Sep 1979	23	36	11	6	24
Feb-Mar 1980	20	37	11	6	26
Aug-Sep 1980	18	40	12	7	23
Oct-Nov 1980	16	42	12	6	24
Jan 1981	14	44	10	6	26
Mar 1981	20	41.5	9	10.5	19

After a constant drop in the Jewish voting public's support over the last 2 years, expressed by 26 percent for the Likud in May 1979 and only 14 percent in January 1981, the number of people who wanted to vote for the Likud (were the elections to be held now) has risen to 20 percent.

In contrast, the alignment, which has enjoyed a constant rise in public support during the same period, from 33 percent in May 1979 to 44 percent in January 1981,

is now suffering a drop of 2.5 percent in its strength and in the January poll it received only 41.5 percent from the sample of Jewish voters. However, even after this change in direction, the alignment still enjoys an appreciable advantage over the Likud.

However, if the Arab vote--which was not taken into account in the poll we are discussing--is taken into account, the estimated division of votes will be as follows:

Alignment	39 percent
Likud	18 percent
Religious Parties	9 percent
Other Parties	10 percent
Arab Parties (mainly Rakah)	6 percent
Undecided	18 percent

Not only has the gap between the alignment and the Likud narrowed, there have also been other important changes in the voters' preferences. First of all, after a long period in which the small parties received only a small portion of the votes, they are enjoying a considerable surge in the current poll, in which their share of the votes has increased dramatically from 6 percent to 10.5 percent.

Three of the small parties were the principal beneficiaries of this upsurge: Tehiya, Shinuy and Shulamit Aloni's list (Ratz), each of which is enjoying genuine gains in the last poll. Were the elections to be held today, each of these three parties would win 2-4 seats in the Knesset; this does not take into account the large number of voters who have not yet decided for whom to vote.

The other small parties are still finding it difficult to cross the voting threshold; and these include the independent liberals, Sheli and Flatto-Sharon. All these parties have lost some of the support they had in the elections to the current Knesset.

[Sentence or more dropped in original] as finance minister, and this is a very high percentage for a finance minister. In the current poll, conducted in March, it emerged that if the elections were held today, it is doubtful that Yiga'el Hurvitz' Rafi would cross the elections threshold.

Another surprise in the current poll was the noticeable drop (7 percent) in the number of people who have not yet decided for whom to vote.

What is the explanation for these changes in the voters' preferences? The explanation springs partly from the fact that the elections campaign has already officially opened and the Histadrut elections will be held in less than 1 month, on 7 April.

The main changes in the voters' preferences have taken place in a section of the population originating in Asia and Africa. Most of the Likud gains in the March poll, compared with that of January, were among this group. The source of this

increase in the Likud's strength lies mainly among the group which is hesitating--those who voted for the Likud in the previous elections, but have not yet decided if they will also vote for it in the upcoming elections because of what appears to them to be the government's failures in the domestic and economic fields. The events on these fronts over the last period of time are what have apparently influenced these voters to change their opinions and support the Likud.

The chief hero in the economic arena over the latest period of time has been the new Finance Minister, Yoram Aridor. In the latest Smith Institute poll the voters were asked: How would you describe Finance Minister Yoram Aridor's economic policy?

A continuation of Yiga'el Hurvitz' policy of rehabilitating the economy: 5 percent.

A new economic policy for rehabilitating the economy and stopping inflation: 21 percent.

An elections year policy in the framework of the country's economic possibilities: 24 percent.

An elections year policy that does not take into account the economic situation after the elections: 33 percent.

Different: 11 percent.

No opinions, do not know: 16 percent.

Only a very small section of the voters--5 percent--regarded Aridor's policy as a continuation of that of Hurvitz. At this early stage about 21 percent of the voters regard this policy as a new economy policy with broader targets. However, the great majority of voters (57 percent) regard Aridor's policy as that of an election year.

Those people with the above views have divided opinions over the question of whether this elections policy is within the scope of the state of Israel's economic abilities or does not take into account the results after the elections. A very large minority--33 percent--thinks that Aridor's policy is harmful, in the final analysis, to the country's economy, while another 24 percent think that it fits in with Israel's economic possibilities.

However, without any connection with their attitudes to Aridor's policy itself, the decisive section of the voters (51 percent) thinks that Aridor's policy will help the Likud in the elections, at least to some extent. There are 23 percent who think that this policy will have no effect on the Likud's chances, for better or for worse. Only 12 percent think that Aridor's policy will damage the Likud's chances in the Knesset elections. The other 14 percent said that they had no views on this question.

The public's expectation that the Likud will benefit from Aridor's policy is confirmed by the genuine changes in the voters' preferences in the latest poll.

At this early stage of the elections campaign, it would not be wise to conclude that there is a decidedly new trend among the voters; only further polls will be able to make a definite decision about this. However, there is no doubt that a "hot" elections campaign may be expected. It must also be remembered that, for the moment, not all the candidates have entered the arena and their entry may cause further changes. At this moment there is no party that can permit itself to wait complacently in the expectation of a certain victory.

CSO: 4805

POLL REVEALS LIKUD STRENGTH INCREASING

TA151035 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Mar 81 p 1

[Pori Public Opinion Poll: "Alignment--50 Knesset Members; Likud--23; Dayan--4; Shulamit Aloni--5"]

[Text] Now, 4 months before the elections set for 30 June, the Likud is showing signs of recovering and its strength has increased to 23 seats. The figures for the people who declare that they will vote for the alignment are stable, standing at 50 seats, more than double the number of those who declare that they will vote for the Likud. A possible list headed by Moshe Dayan has very little attraction and no more than four seats are guaranteed to him. In comparison with this, there is an appreciable increase in Shulamit Aloni's strength and no less than five seats are guaranteed for her. These are the main results of a nationwide Pori Institute Public Opinion Poll conducted at the request of HA'ARETZ.

The poll's director, Pori director Refa'el Gil, comments that the poll, which was conducted during the first week of March, is based upon a double check, both by a poll (the participants were requested to insert sealed voting slips into a mobile polling booth) and through a questionnaire in which the participants were asked openly about their voting intentions.

The poll also shows that there has been a drop in the percentage of "floating votes" who have not yet decided for whom to vote: from 20 percent in the February poll to 12 percent now, so that there is a decision today about 107 of the total 120 Knesset seats. It appears that the rise in the Likud's strength can be explained mainly by the drop in the percentage of floating votes.

The poll director emphasized that these results are only applicable for the first week in March and, of course, there may be many more changes in the composition of the parties and the voting trends by the elections date at the end of June.

Prominent among those voting for the Likud are people of African and Asian origin, men, young people, manual workers and the low income brackets.

Prominent among those voting for the Alignment are people of European and American origin, those who have lived in Israel since before the establishment of the state, adults, the educated classes, people in academic and administrative professions and the high income brackets.

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women aged 18 or more, with voting rights, who were, as mentioned earlier, given personal interviews in their homes through a double poll (open and using experimental polling booths) with a strict respect for their privacy.

POLL SHOWS ALIGNMENT SUPPORTERS LOYAL

TA200914 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 20 Mar 81 p 3

[Correspondent on Party Affairs Report: "Election Poll Encouraging to Alignment's Election Headquarters"]

[Text] Only 35 percent of the Likud voters in 1977 said that they would again vote for the Likud whereas 86 percent of the Alignment voters said they would again vote for the Alignment. These conclusions are included in a poll conducted recently at the request of the Alignment. Professor Asher Arian reported the results of the poll to a meeting of the Alignment's Knesset election headquarters yesterday.

Some 52 percent of the DMC voters in the 1977 elections said that this time they would vote for the Alignment. This finding has encouraged the Alignment because most of the "undecided" ("the floating votes") who have not yet made up their minds would vote for the Alignment in the upcoming election.

A vast majority of those who said they would vote for the Alignment added that they did not favor a coalition with the NRP. According to the findings of the poll, 70 percent of the Alignment's supporters object to a coalition with the religious parties.

Some 86 percent of those polled said that "most of the problems afflicting the state could be remedied and the country could sprout with a good program in hand." It was reported at the meeting that this reply was one of the points contemplated by the Alignment this week when it chose its slogan "together we shall overcome." The Alignment election headquarters described the poll as "encouraging."

CSO: 4805

POLL INDICATES IMPROVEMENT IN PERSONAL ECONOMIC CONDITION

TA261230 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Mar 81 p 1

[Pori Public Opinion Poll: "The Feeling of the Public About the Personal-Economic Condition has Improved"]

[Text] A belief is prevalent among the public that their personal economic condition is improving. Only one-half of the public now complains that they feel the economic burden and that the money they earn is not enough "to tide them over to the end of the month." This is the lowest percentage of complaints registered in the Pori Public Opinion Polls since 1978. This find emerges from the nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ.

To the question, "do you feel that the money you earn makes it possible for you to make both ends meet throughout the month when compared with 6 months ago?" 50.5 percent answered that the money is less sufficient for them now than one-half year ago.

The pollster, Mr Refa'el Gil, notes that in 1980 more than 70 percent of the people complained, in 1979 the rate exceeded 80 percent and in 1978 the rate was approximately 75 percent.

Over one-third, 37.7 percent, said the money is as sufficient for them now as it was before and 5.2 percent said the money is even more sufficient than in the past. Some 6.6 percent refrained from answering.

Among people with high incomes and executive or senior positions, 10 percent said the money is more sufficient for them now than before. The number who declared that the money they earn is enough, "just as previously," exceeds the rate of those who declare that the money they earn is less sufficient than in the past.

The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 people, 18 years old and up, who were personally interviewed throughout the country.

CSO: 4805

DETAILS ON PORI ELECTIONS POLL

TA171045 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Mar 81 p 1

[Pori Public Opinion Poll: Seven Mandates to the NRP, Four to Shinuy and Two to the Tehiya"]

[Text] Following is an account of the votes scored by all the parties and lists as compiled in the experimental polling station run by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ. The vote took place during the first week of March (an initial report on the results of the vote was published yesterday).

Party	Mandates
Alignment	50
Likud	23
NRP	7
Citizens' Rights Movement	5
Shinuy	4
Moshe Dayan	4
Agudat Yisra'el-Po'aley	
Agudat Yisra'el	4
Tehiya	2
Sheli	1
Minorities	5
Others (less than 1 percent)	2
Abstainees	<u>13</u>
Total	120

As mentioned, the results were compiled at an experimental polling station, reducing to a quite large extent the number of those refraining from openly declaring for whom they would vote. This system also largely resembles the real situation at the polling stations on election day.

In response to questions arising in the wake of the publication of the poll yesterday regarding an alleged decline in Moshe Dayan's electoral power, the conductor of the poll explained that the public had not been asked about the hypothetical possibility of the establishment or non-establishment of a list headed by Moshe Dayan. The results at the polling station reflect the public's positions in light of the current situation, that is, at a time when Moshe Dayan has not yet officially announced whether he intends to run for the elections on an independent list.

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS PUBLIC AGAINST RETURNING TERRITORIES

TA011541 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Apr 81 p 3

[Pori Public Opinion Poll: "Majority of Public Against Returning Territories Even for Peace and Full Security"]

[Text] The stands of the Israeli public regarding the return of the territories taken in the 6-day war have not changed in the past 10 years. Most of the public continues to oppose the return of the territories even for "peace and full security." This is the finding of a countrywide Pori Public Opinion Poll which was commissioned by HA'ARETZ. The question put the public 10 years ago and now is: "If we are assured peace and full security, would you be ready to return all the territories taken in the 6-day war?" Then and now, 60 percent replied in the negative. The following is the breakdown of the replies 10 years and today:

	1981	1970
Against returning the territories	62.5 percent	59.6 percent
Agree to return the territories	12.2	8.7
Agree except for Jerusalem	8.0	12.7
Agree to return part of them	13.3	6.3

A socio-economic analysis shows that among the more advanced strata there is a slightly greater propensity to return the territories. The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women throughout the country who were interviewed personally.

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS PUBLIC FAVORS LIMITED AUTONOMY FOR W. BANK

TA241002 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Mar 81 p 4

[Pori Public Opinion Poll: "About One Third Are in Favor of Limited Autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip"]

[Text] From all the various proposals for a solution to the future status of Judaea and Samaria, it appears that that of a limited autonomy seems most reasonable to about one third of all those asked, while the Jordanian option is only acceptable to about 20 percent. Some 10 percent support Israeli annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These are the findings of a nationwide Pori Institute public opinion poll conducted at the request of HA'ARETZ.

The poll presented five different proposals for a solution to the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the public. Of these, 31.7 percent put in the first place the proposal of "limited autonomy with an elected independent rule restricted to matters of pure administration, while Israel continues to supervise such issues as education, the use of land and water and full Israeli control over security."

The second place (22.3 percent) was given to the Jordanian option: An agreement according to which Jewish settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley and certain other territories would remain under Israeli rule, while the other territories would be returned to Jordan.

The third place (12.9 percent) was given to the proposal of full autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for a transition period of 5 years, with an elected self rule, with a Palestinian legislative authority and Israeli security supervision.

The same proportion of people (12.9 percent) also accept the proposal for Israeli annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and the fifth and last place (2.6 percent) was given to the option of a Palestinian state.

Also, 4.9 percent said that none of those five proposals was acceptable to them; and the remaining 12.7 percent said they did not know what was the best solution for the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women.

ALIGNMENT EFFORTS TO TAKE ARAB VOTES FROM RAKAH

TA231223 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 23 Mar 31 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The Alignment's Motto for the Election in the Arab Street: 'Any Vote for Rakah is a Vote for the Likud'"]

[Excerpt] "Every vote for Rakah is a vote for the Likud and will result in undermining Jewish-Arab relations," reads the Alignment's motto to the Arab sector, circulated in the Arab streets, concerning the election to the 10th Knesset.

There is an inclination in the Labor Party to make possible the establishment of a separate list of [Arab] public figures and influential Bedouin that would provide an alternative to Rakah.

At the same time, the trend is to guarantee the incorporation of Arab candidates into realistic places in the Alignment's Knesset list. The selection of the Arab representatives to the "EMET" [Alignment's letters on the voting ticket] will be completed in each Arab district and will be done conjointly by all the delegates. This was reported by the Alignment's election headquarters in the Arab and Druze sector.

The Alignment will recruit all the elected Arab public figures--heads of local authorities and their representatives, religious figures and notables as well as influential young people and members of clans--to the election campaign in the Arab sector.

CSO: 4805

'PERMANENT NAMES' GIVEN TO GOLAN SETTLEMENTS

TA311457 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 0855 GMT 31 Mar 81

[Text] Qiryat Shemona, 31 Mar--Permanent names have been given to the new settlements on the Golan Heights that will receive inhabitants this May. The new names will replace temporary names these places had been given earlier.

The settlement to be established near the deserted village of Qal'ah in the northern Golan Heights will now be called Qela'. This will be a farmers association settlement that will be inhabited primarily by second generation members of the well-established veteran Galilee Moshavot who are unable to be absorbed in their parents' settlement but who nevertheless decided to pursue the agricultural tradition in the Golan Heights.

The place thus far known as Yequza or "Golan 4" has been renamed Mezar. It is located in the southern tip of the Golan Heights, not far from the Yarmuk River. This will be a kibbutz that will be linked to Ihud Haqevutzot Vehakibbutzin [Mapai affiliated settlement union]. Its establishment and the formation of the nucleus of its inhabitants is being taken care of by Qevutzat Deganya "A", the oldest Qevutza.

The settlement previously called Juwauzah in the central part of the Golan Heights will from now on be called Allone Habashan. It will be a religious Moshav cooperative affiliated with the [NRP's] Hapo'el Hamizrahi's settlement movement. It is situated in the area between Kibbutz 'En Zivan and Moshav Qeshet and will "close a gap" in that part of the Golan Heights. The members of this settlement's nucleus wanted to call it "Havat Ya'ir," but the government names committee did not approve the name, claiming that the biblical "Havat Ya'ir" was not located there.

CSO: 4805

NEW GROUP TO OPPOSE WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI

TA302050 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 30 Mar 81

[Excerpt] The founding assembly of a public council that will initiate acts of protest against the withdrawal includes personalities such as reserves Major Generals Dan Laner, Me'ir Zore'a and Avraham Yofe, poets Na'omi Shemer, A. Hillel and Yitzhaq Shalev, Prof Ze'ev Vilna'i and Dr Moshe Sharon, a former adviser to the prime minister on Arabs' affairs. This evening, our correspondent Menashe Raz, reported from Zoa House where the rally was held:

[Begin recording] [Raz] The rally this evening was organized by several public figures, professors and settlers from beyond the green line. The participants emphasized that their activities were nonpartisan and would proceed with no connection to any of the parties running for the Knesset election. Thus, among the activists, one could find well-known people from the Tehiya movement and Gush Emunim as well as members of Moshavim and Kibutzim affiliated with the Labor Party. All of them are hawks and they all believe that a struggle should be waged against the withdrawal from the Sinai. They are encouraged by a public opinion poll conducted by the Dahaf Institute that claimed that 60 percent of the Israeli public objected to a total withdrawal from the Sinai in spite of the Camp David accords. Following the rally tonight, a permanent public council will be established that will coordinate all the acts of protest and opposition to the withdrawal from the Sinai scheduled to end within approximately 1 year, according to the Camp David accords. [End recording]

CSO: 4805

ISRAELIS BELIEVE PEACE DEPENDS ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE

TA311623 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Mar 81 p 3

[Pori Public Opinion Poll: "The Majority Believes It Is Impossible to Reach Peace Without Solving the Palestinian Problem"]

[Text] The majority of the Israeli public believes it is impossible to reach a peace agreement with the Arab countries without solving the Palestinian problem. This emerges from the nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute and commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

To the question--"Is it possible or impossible to reach a peace agreement with the Arab countries without solving the Palestinian problem?"--69.3 percent said yes while 15.2 percent said no. Another 6.1 percent said "perhaps" but this depends on the positions of the Arab countries, on whether an agreement on this issue is reached between Jordan and Israel and also on the U.S. and Soviet policies.

It should be noted that the rate of those who believe it is possible to reach a peace agreement also without solving the Palestinian problem declined by 6.5 percent, from 21.7 percent in the last poll dealing with this issue in July 1980 (published in HA'ARETZ on 11 July 1980) to 15.2 percent now. Of all those polled 9.4 percent had no view on the matter.

The public opinion poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 people throughout the country.

CSO: 4805

DEVELOPMENT PLANS IMPLEMENTED IN GOLAN

TA311617 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 31 Mar 81 p 1

[Staff report: "Development Plans Worth 100 Million Shekels are Being Carried Out in the Golan Heights"]

[Excerpts] Plans for investment in new plants and for expanding existing plants costing 100 million shekels are now being implemented on the Golan Heights.

Commerce and Industry Minister Gid'on Pat has reported this to the Knesset Economic Committee.

The minister noted that the implementation of these plans will add about 120 jobs, half of them in the town of Qazrin. Plans are being examined to set up in Qazrin a plant for engine regulators and a guitar factory that will add about 40 to 50 jobs.

About 35 industrial and other plants are now operating on the Golan Heights. These plants employ more than 400 workers and have been given the status of approved plants which enables them to get loans at the rate of 40 percent of their investment and grants at the rate of 35 percent of their investment. The plants are in fields such as metals and electronics, textiles, building, packing and cooling [last three as published], ceramics, and irrigation. Some of the plants specialize in exports.

CSO: 4805

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY GOLAN SETTLEMENT PROGRAM OUTLINED

TA010835 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 1 Apr 81

[Text] Four new settlements are being planned for the Golan Heights. They will join the existing 23 settlements and 3 which are being built now. The agriculture ministry has completed a program for expanding Golan Heights settlement. The plan is based on an investment of over 1 billion shekels over a period of a year. Our correspondent for settlement affairs Avraham Ben-Melekh reports that this budget has not been approved so far.

[Begin Ben-Melekh recording] The housing clause in the agriculture ministry's program of expanding Golan Heights settlement totals 360 million shekels. Among other things this is meant for the erection of 600 apartments in the town of Qazrin and 400 apartments in the rural settlements. A sum of 175 million shekels is needed for developing sources of employment in the fields of industry and tourism; a sum of 170 shekels is required for the regional industry, including water and groundbreaking projects. This amounts to over a billion shekels.

The main objective of this program worked out jointly with the Golan settlers' representatives is the development and strengthening of the Golan City of Qazrin. It is planned to turn Qazrin into a lever for populating the entire Golan Heights area. The plan intends to increase the number of Jewish settlers in the Golan from less than 6,000 people today to more than 10,000 next year. The present picture of the situation in the Golan includes the city of Qazrin with only 1,200 people, 23 rural settlements with 4,000 settlers, 2 regional centers with 650 inhabitants and 3 new settlements which will be populated shortly. Four new settlements are planned to join the above settlements: (Ben Samsam), at Si'on, one near Tall al-Faris, and a fourth settlement in the north of the Golan Heights. However, in the meantime no budget has been approved for these four settlements. No budget has yet been allocated for expanding the existing Golan settlements either. This may be the source for the bitter disappointment prevailing among the settlers. They claim that the government's enthusiasm for strengthening Judea and Samaria settlements made it forget the Golan Heights settlers. [End recording]

CSO: 4805

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FIGURES FOR 1980 RELEASED

TA231230 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 23 Mar 81 p 4

[Unattributed report: "In 1980 There was a 3.7 percent Decline in Industrial Production"]

[Text: Industrial production in fixed prices (pertaining to those plants that employ hired labor and excluding the diamond industry) went down in 1980 by 3.7 percent compared with 1979.

This decrease reflects primarily the low level of production marked in the first quarter of 1980 as against the last quarter of 1979 (a 10 percent decline), which continued in the second quarter of 1980 although at a smaller rate (an increase of 4 percent in comparison with the first quarter of 1980). In the third and fourth quarters [of 1980] industrial production thus returned to the average level reached throughout 1979 (after the regular seasonal fluctuations have been deducted). This was reported in Jerusalem by the spokesman for the Central Bureau of Statistics. The spokesman added that since the 1950's a similar decline in industrial production (namely 3.5 percent) was registered only in 1967 as compared with 1966 (the recession period and the 6-day war).

In the last decade, between 1970 and 1979, there was a steady increase in industrial production at an average rate of more than 6 percent per annum. In 1978 and 1979 industrial production went up by more than 5 percent throughout each year compared with the previous year. In 1980, an average decline in industrial production compared with 1979 was marked in most fields, except for an increase in stone quarrying (8 percent); printing and publishing (9 percent) and clothing (4 percent).

It further emerges from the data supplied by the Central Bureau of Statistics that in 1980 the number of hired personnel in industry, compared with 1979, went down by approximately 4 percent (about 10,500) and the number of actual employed people's working days declined by more than 3 percent. The decline in the hiring rate was marked in all the fields except for the stone quarrying area, where a 2 percent increase was registered. It should be noted that there was a 1 percent increase in the number of hired labor in the last quarter of 1980 compared with the three preceding quarters.

Productivity per working day, calculated according to the ratio of changes in industrial production versus changes in actual working days of hired labor, did not change in 1980 compared with 1979. It should be pointed out that compared with 1978, in 1979 there was an increase in the productivity per day of about 1 percent whereas in 1978 a 6 percent increase was noted.

In 1980 the daily wages for an employee (not including one-time payments and wage differences for previous periods) went up by approximately 131 percent compared with 1979, a change similar to the change in the consumer price index.

CSO: 4805

STATISTICS RELEASED ON FIREARMS

TA031655 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Apr 81 pp 1, 3

[Re'uven Shapira report: "200,000 Licensed Firearms in Israel--And Tens of Thousands Unlicensed Ones"]

[Excerpt] In the wake of the assassination attempt against President Reagan, the U.S. administration has begun conducting a world survey of arms licensing, arms owned by civilians and arms controls exercised by various countries, apparently to formulate a stand on arms control and licensing in the United States.

Israel learned about the survey through a request submitted to the Interior Ministry in Jerusalem this week. A meeting took place on Wednesday between a U.S. administration representative and the director of the Interior Ministry's Licensing and Control Department, Moshe Weiss, at which the U.S. official requested data on the number of licensed arms owned by Israeli civilians, the conditions of the license and control procedures.

Israeli civilians today own some 155,000 licensed arms (70 percent of them are pistols). Some 45,000 licensed firearms are owned by various institutions, factories, security companies and security elements for self-defense and for security purposes (the arms are given to workers according to personal permits approved by the interior ministry following pertinent checks).

In addition to these 200,000 firearms, several tens of thousands of arms are held by soldiers and civil guard volunteers (these arms do not require a license from the Interior Ministry). An unknown number of arms estimated at various tens of thousands also circulate in the "market," particularly among criminals. Most of these arms are stolen.

A 15 percent rise in the number of licensed arms owned by civilians occurs each year despite the fact that in recent years the criteria for receiving a license have become stricter in order to reduce the number of firearms owned by civilians. Therefore licenses are issued only to people who really need arms and can prove this.

About 1,000 firearms of various types (pistols, rifles, submachine guns) are stolen or get lost in Israel each year and most of them are never found again. Most of

the arms that disappear apparently reach the underworld and, in some cases, terrorist organizations. A cautious estimate is that some 25,000 firearms have disappeared since the establishment of the State of Israel and have never been traced.

Until about 3 years ago, any Israeli citizen who did not have a police record could easily receive a license, especially for a pistol, if he alleged he needed the weapon for "target practice" although he never intended it for this purpose. Today, licenses are only issued to a person who can prove that he practices target-shooting and purchases very expensive and special weapons for this purpose. The cost of such a weapon is several thousand Israeli shekels. Whoever applies for an arms license for self-defense encounters many obstacles. He has to prove that he has a reasonable motive for owning a weapon and if, for instance, he claims that he drives through dangerous areas in the territories he also has to provide proof to that effect.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

TAX COLLECTION--Tax collection for 1980-1981 totaled 48.7 billion shekels compared with 46.54 billion shekels estimated in the budget. This was reported by the director of the State Revenues Administration, Mr Uri'el Lynn. [TA201913 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Mar 81 p 5 TA]

RESEARCH WITH FRG--Biotechnical research costing 6 million shekels a year is being carried out within the framework of an agreement between the FRG Research and Technology Ministry and the Israeli Energy Ministry's National Council for Research and Development. The German Ministry will expand the new joint Israeli-German research projects in biotechnology. This was reported at the close of a meeting between the Energy Ministry's Research and Development Council and FRG Government representatives. [Jerusalem Government Press Office in Hebrew 19 Mar 81 TA]

POLICE PREVENT DEMONSTRATION--A short time ago the security forces set barriers along the access road between Yamit and the border terminal at Ne'ot Sinay after it emerged that the Yamit Strip inhabitants planned to disrupt traffic. A barrier was also set up at the entrance to the settlement of Ne'ot Sinay and the soldiers do not permit the inhabitants to leave the site. Our correspondent, Yaron Enosh, reports that the inhabitants are again complaining that the government is dragging its feet in their case. The demonstration was organized by the Yamit Strip settlements committee. The Ma'oz movement--which objects to the evacuation of the Yamit Strip--has expressed its objection to the demonstration. Ma'oz members who live in the Strip have said that they will not assume responsibility for the ongoing violence of a small group of inhabitants of the Strip, as they phrased it. The Ma'oz members called on the inhabitants to join in a common struggle, not for receiving compensation but rather for halting the withdrawal from the Sinai. [Text] [TA220722 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 22 Mar 81]

SYRIAN TRANSMISSION INTERFERENCE--The Syrians have been recently activating television transmitters near the Israeli border beaming broadcasts on a frequency similar to that of the Israeli television, whose transmitters are located in Zefat and in Kohav Hayarden. Our correspondent, Gadl Sukenink, reports that the Syrian broadcasts have considerably interfered with the Israeli television transmissions in the upper and the lower Galilee and in the Jordan Valley. The communications ministry intends to promptly work for improving the situation although it has not yet found a solution to the interference problem. The Syrian transmitters have been stationed in high locations, near the border junction of Syrian, Jordan and Israel, in the vicinity of Hammah. [Text] [TA211145 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 21 Mar 81]

DROP IN ILLITERACY--The number of illiterates in Israel has dropped to half its rate 20 years ago. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Education shows that the average Israeli's level of education has been on the rise. This is particularly noticeable among Israelis from Asian and African countries. More and more people of Islamic country extraction obtain secondary and higher education. There was a 1-percent rise on the number of university students from among second-generation Israelis and Israelis from Asian and African countries, whereas a slight decline has been marked in the student ratio of Israelis from European and Western countries. There has also been a systematic decline in the number of dropouts. According to the people who conducted the survey, this results from the compulsory education law, making schooling up to the 10th grade obligatory and from the fact that tuition up to the 12th grade is free. [TA141300 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 13 Mar 81 TA]

VEHICLE LICENSING BUREAU--Jerusalem, 17 Mar--The first vehicle licensing bureau designed to serve the Jewish settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley was opened today by the director-general of the Transport Ministry, Mr Arye Grozbord, in Ma'ale Efrayim, which is in the Jordan Rift Valley. In his congratulatory remarks, the transport ministry director-general stated that his ministry regards the Jewish settlements throughout Judaea and Samaria as being like those in any other part of the state of Israel and that the transport ministry will do all it can to equalize the level of services to the residents of this area--both in terms of licensing and public transportation--with that prevailing in the rest of the state of Israel. [Excerpt] [TA171708 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1610 GMT 17 Mar 81]

AUTONOMY PROBLEM POLL--The majority of the Israeli public sees no urgent need to reach an agreement on autonomy. This emerges from a national Pori Institute Public Opinion Poll conducted at the request of HA'ARETZ. In reply to the question: "In view of the latest events in the Middle East, how urgent is it in your opinion to reach an agreement on autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as quickly as possible?" 39.7 percent replied that the matter "is not urgent" whereas 28.9 percent said the issue is "extremely urgent." Another 19 percent said the subject was "somewhat pressing" and the remaining 12.4 percent had no opinion either way. In a Pori poll conducted in October 1980, the results were similar. Six months ago, too, 35.4 percent thought that an autonomy agreement "is not urgent" versus 23.2 percent who then said it was "very urgent." The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 men and women throughout the country personally interviewed. [Text] [TA290834 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Mar 81 p 8]

HEBRON LANDS STATE-OWNED--The military authorities have informed the Hebron Mukhtars that additional lands near Qiryat Arba' have been declared state lands. The attorneys of local inhabitants told our correspondent, Pinhas 'Inbari, that one of the places where these lands are located in a Wadi and a school as well as houses are built there. There was a clash between IDF soldiers and inhabitants of the village al-Shuyukh in the Hebron district on lands which belong to this village. A large group of villagers came to plant trees on land declared state land. The IDF soldiers prevented them from doing so. They uprooted the plants but the villagers moved to an adjacent plot of land where they repeated their action. The IDF soldiers surrounded them so as to prevent the planting. Hebron acting mayor Mustafa 'Abd an-Nabi an-Natshah claims that the soldiers beat the villagers but the military authorities deny this. [Text] [TA301701 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 30 Mar 81]

PERES' JORDANIAN BORDERLINE PLAN--Labor Party Chairman Shim'on Peres said that the Alignment would demand that Israel maintain early-warning stations on the mountain ridges as part of a peace agreement with Jordan, in addition to the Jordan Rift Valley, Jerusalem and Gush 'Ezyon. Peres said that all the territories Israel will evacuate in the West Bank will remain demilitarized and Jordan will be offered a land corridor approximately 15 km wide between its territory and the West Bank. If no agreement is reached between Jordan and Israel, it will be necessary to reach an interim agreement between the two countries. [Text] [TA311017 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 31 Mar 81]

PLANES TO MEXICO--The aircraft industries have recently finalized a deal for the sale of four of its Westwind planes to the Mexican (Sarsa) Concern. In 1980 alone the aircraft industries sold 73 Westwinds for a price of more than \$200 million. These details were reported to the news editors of the Israeli press when they visited the aircraft industries at the Ben-Gurion Airport. Most of the Westwinds produced by the aircraft industries are sold to the United States. Surveys conducted in the United States show that the aircraft industries make about 26 percent of all the sales of executive aircraft in the United States, in price groups of between \$2.5 to 4.5 million per plane, and the Westwind is also sold successfully beyond the borders of the United States. [Excerpt] [TA241044 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Mar 81 p 4]

NATIONAL FUND OUTPOSTS IN GALILEE, W. BANK--In the coming fiscal year the Jewish National Fund will establish four observation posts in the Galilee and 13 settlement centers and outposts in Judaea, Samaria, the Galilee and the Negev. This was reported today by Jewish National Fund Director General Moshe Rivlin and the fund's administrative director, Hayim Ben-Shemesh. [Excerpt] [TA241637 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 24 Mar 81]

NEW KNESSET LIST PRESENTS PLATFORM--At a news conference in Jerusalem today, the list for Peace and Civil Rights [Hareshima Leshalom U'lizkhuyot Ha'ezrah] presented its plan for the future of the territories. The list is an amalgamation of the civil rights' movement, the He Be'iyar group and a group of activists from the Peace Now Movement. The plan was presented by Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, who was occupied with the affairs of the city's Arabs. He said that the options being offered to the Israeli voter ignored the reality prevailing in the territories. According to his plan, broad political and civil autonomy should be given to the inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria and, after that, we should break away from them in order to permit a partition solution. [Text] [TA151452 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 15 Mar 81]

ZIONIST IMMIGRATION BUDGET CUT--The World Zionist Organization will today decide on an approximately \$3 million cut in the immigration budget for fiscal 1981/1982. The organization's overall budget will amount to \$55 million (compared with \$58 million last year) of which the lion's share is slated for immigration and involves some \$19 million; the budget allocation for representatives of all the organization's departments (youth and hehalutz [pioneer], immigration, teachers' and the like) will reach approximately \$17 million. This HA'ARETZ reporter has learned that in view of the intention of substantially cutting the number of representatives abroad (by about 40 percent) all the youth movement representatives have been invited to participate in today's Zionist organization directorate meeting. [Gid'on Alon] [Text] [TA231319 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Mar 81 p 3]

BRIEFS

FRENCH WIN TELEPHONE CONTRACT--Jordan last week became the 10th Arab country to order the highly successful E-10 digital telephone exchange system from the French manufacturers Cit-Alcatel; the contract, worth FF 600 million (\$130 million), follows a \$47.7 million order from Lebanon for 23 exchanges which are due to become operational later this year (An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO, November 24, 1980). Cit-Alcatel heads a consortium which has been commissioned by Jordan to execute a modernisation programme covering the principal towns as well as rural areas; as this newsletter reported in its January 12 issue, Jordan is part of the second pan-Arab telecommunications network and received a \$13.8 million credit from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development to help finance its contribution to the project. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 30 Mar 81 p 12]

CSO: 4820

CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR EXPLAINS POLICIES

London 8 DAYS in English 28 Mar 81 pp 34-37

[Interview with Regeb Misallati, Central Bank Governor, by Michel Szwed-Cousins]

[Text]

The Libyan authorities have taken strong measures to ensure that the country's people keep their surplus funds in bank accounts rather than cash. In a rare interview, central bank governor Regeb Misallati explains Libya's banking policy to MICHEL SZWED-COUSINS.

THE GREEN BOOK, Moammar Qaddafi's political testament, is the blueprint for the transformation of Libyan society. In it, the Libyan leader says he would like to abolish money. Paradoxically, banking has become a central pillar of the new Libyan economic order as a result, as the authorities try to wean people away from dependence on cash to the use of bank accounts where the fruits of their labours can be stored.

The authorities have tried to encourage Libyans to open bank accounts and use them for some time, but without much success. Last May they decided to try strongarm tactics. All the five and ten dinar notes in circulation were withdrawn, and people returning them to the banks found they were only allowed Libyan dinars 1,000 (\$3,377) worth of cash in new notes. They were given a receipt for the rest.

This January, at the annual ordinary meeting of the General People's Congress, it was decided to take even tougher measures to force people to use the banks. All payments of over LD100 (\$337) made by secretariats, public corporations, municipalities and public sector companies

are to be made by cheque.

The decision is very important, since — in view of Libya's highly socialised economy — it will impinge on the overwhelming bulk of the population, forcing them to open and use bank accounts. Moreover, to force people to keep their money in the bank, the GPC decided to put a limit of LD500 (\$1,688) on the monthly amount individuals can withdraw in cash, over and above which payments will have to be made by cheque. There are exceptions, such as cash needs for the Mecca pilgrimage, for a holiday, for marriages and funerals, but the authorities make it clear they intend strictly to enforce the new laws.

However, can Libya's five commercial banks — the Sahara, the Jamahiriya, the Umma (people's), the Wahda (unity), and the Tajari al Watani (national commercial) Bank — cope with the expected influx of business?

Question: Encouraging all Libyans to hold bank accounts is one of the main strands of official Libyan thinking, and at the last meeting of the General People's Congress (GPC) it was decided that all public sector wage bills, accounts and other payments over LD100 had to be paid by cheque. How effective has the policy been so far? Has it been reflected in an increase in the number of bank accounts and in greater commercial bank activity?

Answer: Unfortunately, it is still too early to say, and we don't have any figures available so far. But this major decision is now being implemented. The whole public sector has been asked to use only cheques

for their outgoing payments and to accept them in payment. I have been looking at the number of cheques passing through the clearing houses since implementation of the January decision began about three weeks ago, and it is increasing daily. It has gone up by about 20 per cent.

Perhaps I should give you some background as to why the GPC came to this decision. In this country, the average family income is quite substantial. On top of this, there is free medical care, free education, subsidised food, and housing is almost free — people have up to 20 years to pay for their homes and it's free of interest. With all the excess cash, people have been buying anything and everything available. We wanted to encourage people to save instead of spend.

To get people into the habit of banking, we have opened almost a hundred bank branches since the revolution, throughout the country. Every village with 10,000 people and over is now provided with a bank. We now have about 122 branches, and here I am only speaking of the commercial banks. So to get the policy moving, we decided to pay all the salaries of civil servants and white collar workers through bank accounts.

Was there not some initial difficulty in implementing the decision limiting cash withdrawals to LD500 a month? It appears that not just individuals, but companies, were not allowed more than LD500 in cash. Companies such as Esso suddenly found they had next to no ready cash because the banks refused it to them for a couple of days before the problem was ironed out.

There should be no problems at all. The LD500 is the limit for individuals, for their pocket expenses like food and petrol — LD500 is a lot of money.

In implementing this policy, is not one of the major obstacles the lack of sufficient bank branches to cater for the people's needs?

Yes and no. In the big cities and other fair-sized towns, there are a number of banks. In Tripoli there are around 15 branches, in Benghazi there are about 12. In smaller towns like Misratah and Darnah, there are four or five.

Is that enough?

It used to be. But now we're asking the banks to open more branches, especially in villages a long way from the coast. We are to have a meeting next week with the chairmen of the commercial banks, and we will ask them to open new offices.

At present, you have five commercial banks. Are you planning to create any new banking establishments?

We are quite satisfied with our present system of banking. There will be some refinements to cope with the new economic concepts of the country, with the third international theory. I think we do have some sort of competition, with the five commercial banks. We are leaving them to run their own banks according to normal banking practice, without much interference.

Besides the legal restrictions — the LD100 and LD500 limits — what other measures are you taking to encourage people to keep their money in the bank? What about interest rates?

We have introduced savings certificates which earn quite a substantial return — six per cent — which is free of income tax.

What maturity do they have?

A ten-year maturity, but people can redeem them, if they wish, after six months but not before. We have also raised interest rates on savings accounts and on time deposits to nine per cent. The interest rate on bank loans is a maximum 7.5 per cent, so the banks are actually subsidising the deposits.

Are you finding that people are taking out overdrafts at 7.5 per cent and reinvesting at 9 per cent?

No. Technically it is possible, but it hasn't happened.

In the Green Book, Moammar Qaddafi says he wants to abolish money. So far, many things set out in the Green Book have been implemented through the GPC. Do you see money as we know it being abolished in Libya and if so, when?

I am not in a position to answer that. But we are trying not to put much emphasis on money. We are trying to educate people that real value is not in money but in production. However, I think we will have to carry on with money as a unit of account, as a means of exchange, for some time, until we are quite ready to fulfil the sayings of the Green Book.

But do you think that some time in the future money in the form of cash and coins will be abolished in Libya?

In theory it could, as the Green Book says, but this will take a long time. When we change completely to a system where there is sufficient production to cover all needs, and the teachings of the Green Book are implemented in letter and spirit, then, I think, we will be able to abolish money as we understand it. But who knows when we will reach that stage? Maybe next year, maybe in ten years.

The Libyan banking system uses interest. Are there any plans to adopt an Islamic

system of banking similar, say, to the one worked out by the Union of Islamic Banks?

This is a very important question and the subject is controversial. I don't think the present interest system is usury. We have to think why usury was forbidden by the Quran and decide whether the evils of usury which existed at that time still exist or not, whether people are being harmed by paying interest or not.

If I grant a loan to an entrepreneur to build a factory in which he can employ three or four hundred people, providing a living for them, and he can still repay me my capital plus the rate of interest which is no more than the cost of the money to the lender — and which sometimes is not even enough to cover the depreciation of the value of money — and still get a profit for himself, I don't think that's usury. We abolished interest rates on housing because we felt it was a bit doubtful, but I don't think interest on loans for production purposes constitutes usury. That's my personal view. We are working with other Islamic countries — we are shareholders in the Islamic Development Bank, and we are following its progress quite closely to see how it's going.

Is there any intention to set up a commercial bank run on Islamic lines like those of the Union of Islamic Banks?

We thought of it a few years ago, but have not come to a decision yet. A lot of ulemas disagree with me, though.

Last May, when the decision was taken to change the five and ten dinar notes, those people who tried to change their money at the banks were given the first 1,000 dinars in cash and a receipt for the rest. There was some disquiet at the time, and last June Moammar Qaddafi promised that, after each case had been looked into to see if there was any corruption involved in obtaining such large amounts of money, the extra amount would be returned to individuals' bank accounts. Has this been done?

It is being done right now. Everyone who has a receipt can now put it into his current account. The action we took last May has been misinterpreted. The measure I mentioned failed to induce people to put their money in the banks. We are a developing nation, and like all developing nations, nearly all transactions are in cash, but we would like people to stop transacting in cash.

We found that the measures passed prior to May 1980 failed to bring down the amount of cash in circulation. We had to withdraw the five and ten dinar notes from circulation so as to force people to bring them into the banks. Those funds are now being deposited in the accounts of the various individuals concerned. They can spend that money by cheque, but they can only take out what cash is necessary for their normal requirements.

The policy has been successful. Previously, the money in circulation was about LD1.1bn (\$3.7bn). Now it is down to LD700m (\$2.3bn).

Libya has fairly draconian penalties for those who issue cheques without sufficient money in their accounts to cover them. For example, six months in jail and a fine of up to LD5000 (\$1,688) for cheques up to LD1,000 (3,377) and one year in jail and a fine of up to LD5,000 (\$16,886) for cheques over LD1,000. Has this had much effect?

These measures were introduced recently. When you ask people to keep their money in the banks and use only cheques for payments, and you tell companies and establishments such as customs, gas and electricity departments that everybody has to accept cheques, you have to establish safeguards. Otherwise they will start receiving cheques with insufficient balance behind them. Unless you impose severe penalties for those who issue cheques with insufficient credit, there will be no credibility for the chequeing system.

“ We are trying to educate people that real value is not in money but in production. However, I think we will have to carry on with money as a unit of account, as a means of exchange, for some time, until we are ready to fulfil the sayings of the Green Book ”

You are afraid that because everyone is told to use cheques, some will start using them recklessly?

Exactly.

How easy is it for an individual to get an overdraft if he wants to go on holiday or buy a car?

An individual can go to a commercial bank and get a personal loan. It has to be repaid within a fairly short period of time — 12 or 18 months. He has to keep his account with the bank, the normal requirements of any commercial bank in the world. But we don't encourage people to take out loans for what we consider unnecessary expenses. Perhaps we can lend him the money for a car, if it is necessary for him, though personally I think it is more important to improve the public transport system rather than encourage people to get loans to buy more cars.

The excess cash the banks have managed to accumulate is now being invested in development. If a state sector company wants cash to buy equipment are they, as part of the state sector, charged interest?

Yes, between 7-7.5 per cent. And I can tell you they have to satisfy the bank that they are doing good business, running their company in a proper way, and that they can repay the money.

So there would not be any attempt to bail out a company just because it is in the state sector?

These are deposits, other people's money. The bank cannot just throw them away — if a bank finds out that a company is not doing well, that there is mismanagement or whatever, the bank is entitled to report it to the secretary. Of course the bank manager has to discuss the matter with his customer first, but if the client doesn't listen he can report the matter, stop giving the customer any further facilities, and recall his loan.

In other words you are following the usual international banking procedures.

Exactly.

What about loans to individuals for housing? At this year's GPC it was decided to set up a housing bank. Would it be possible for an individual to go to his commercial bank and get a mortgage loan, or would he be advised to go to the housing bank?

Because the new housing bank has just been established and has not yet started business, an individual can go to a bank and get a loan of up to LD20,000 (\$67,544), free of interest, repayable in twenty years. Provided of course that he is married, has sufficient income to repay the instalments, has land to build on and so on.

So the idea of the housing bank is to take this area of lending out of the commercial banking sector?

Exactly. There was a small housing bank before, established years ago, but it was very small — not really a bank but more like a fund. Till now most of the loans for housing have gone through the commercial banks. They have lent something like LD400m (\$1.3bn). The new bank is being capitalised at LD100m (\$338m), and there will be annual allocations as well.

Will the interest charged be tax deductible?

I don't think our income tax laws provide for such exemptions. It will be regarded as a normal expense.

Will people taking out loans have to keep their current account at the housing bank?

The new housing bank will not deal with current accounts or accept deposits, but it is allowed to start issuing housing bonds. If I had a one-year-old child I could start buying two or three dinars' worth of bonds monthly. When he grew up, the bank would provide him with a home from the funds plus the interest.

In other words, it is similar to a mortgage society.

It is. But deposits will only be accepted from those planning to get their own house. They are not refundable, they can only be redeemed in kind.

LARGE HOTEL CONTRACT GOES TO SWEDEN

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 30 Mar 81 pp 3-4

[Text]

The image which Libya has acquired (some would say projected) in recent years is that of a country whose rulers are given to inflammatory statements and Quixotic, if not downright perverse, gestures. Less widely reported is Libya's hard-headed attitude to trade; the biggest client for Libyan crude oil is the US, the great imperialist evil of Col Qadhafi's imprecations.

Further striking proof of Libya's pragmatism came last week, when the Swedish construction group Skanska Cementguteriet won a contract worth SKr 1 billion (\$225 million) in Libya, the largest order in its history. The contract, signed in Tripoli, was awarded only a month after Libya threatened to cut off oil supplies to Sweden in retaliation for the government's refusal to allow a Swedish firm to provide Libyan students with military training (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, February 23).

The dispute, which centres on an agreement between Libya and the electronics firm TELUB, continues to simmer and early this month the opposition in Stockholm demanded the resignation of three government ministers who it said knew of the military training clauses in the agreement before they were disclosed by TELUB's

new management.

The contract won by Skanska Cementguteriet is for a hotel in Benghazi and two tourist resorts on Libya's Mediterranean coast; it brings the firm's order book in Libya to SKr 1.6 billion (\$363 million) and the total value of its foreign contracts to almost SKr 3 billion (\$680 million).

The Benghazi hotel will have 288 rooms, restaurants and a cafeteria. The two resorts are due to be completed as turnkey projects in Benghazi and Tripoli and handed over in three years; the Tripoli resort comprises about 100 small villas, restaurants, swimming pools, shops, clinics and mosques.

The signing of the contract will no doubt go some way towards allaying the fears of France that a dispute over Libya's intervention in Chad will result in suspended oil supplies and/or a loss of export markets. French exports to Libya last year totalled about \$680 million, while Libya was France's fifth-ranking source of oil supplies. The row came to a head when the French government banned the sale of 10 fast patrol boats ordered by Libya (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, March 9).

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

HOUSING MINISTRY OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON HOUSING SHORTAGE

Aden SAWT AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 5 Mar 81 p 5

[Interview with Sultan 'Abd al-Wali Salih, Secretary of the Party Rank-and-File Organization in the Ministry of Housing Secretariat, by Ahmad Qasim 'Abdullah: "Ministry of Housing, Actions Underway to Solve Housing Crisis"]

[Text] In light of the second 5-year plan directions, several housing projects have been included, aimed at dealing with the housing crisis from which many citizens suffer, by virtue of family growth, and the migration of many rural families to the capital. In addition, many cadres, after having been trained outside the country, have graduated and returned. Through these projects, which everyone is watching, a citizen will be able to obtain an attached, comfortable home to shelter him and every person in his family, after long suffering.

The inclusion of many housing projects in the second 5-year plan, and earmarking large funds to meet their requirements, confirm for us the sincere intentions and appropriate attention, with which our party, the Yemeni Socialist party, pursues a solution to this crisis. It considers 1981 to be the housing year.

In view of the prominent role, which the comrade members and acting members in the party rank-and-file organization, and the other people's organizations, play in the Ministry of Housing secretariat, I arranged this interview, as a newspaper correspondent, with Comrade Sultan 'Abd al-Wali Salih, secretary of the party rank-and-file organization in the Ministry of Housing secretariat, who graciously responded to my questions. In view of this interview's importance, the newspaper is publishing it.

[Question] Every day we see strong pressures being applied on the secretariat of the Ministry of Housing by the citizens, even though housing offices are located in every district, whose basic job is to deal with housing matters, which have become the citizens' main preoccupation. Do you think that citizens resorting to the central housing bureau reflects on the inability of housing offices in the districts to deal with these housing matters, which recently have become serious?

[Answer] The truth is that the housing issue has become the talk of the people. That is because of family growth, since the individual in the family has begun to demand his own house, in order to be independent of his family. In fact, this is a legal right, and satisfying this problem is a necessity. Our party's charter confirms that. We know very well that there are efforts being made by the party and the state. The evidence for that is the statement issued by the emergency general conference of the Socialist party, which emphasized that 1981 is the housing year.

Regarding the intense pressures by the citizenry on the ministry's secretariat, there are in fact daily pressures, in addition to pressures on the housing offices in the districts. The truth is that we are grateful for and praise the efforts put forth by those responsible for the branch housing offices, in dealing with many of the various housing problems, despite the fact that there was a pamphlet published previously by the minister of state for cabinet affairs, which made it clear to all officials of the state, in all work and production places, to submit their housing requests through their organizations. This was because of the large number of reports submitted, which regulate this problem. It was noted that some people thought that by daily follow-up, they would be able to obtain a house very quickly, as if the problem was devoid of regulations. The ministry, since its inception, has been striving to establish suitable procedures, to go beyond the haphazard work that was associated with this before the ministry was created, and to intensify the need to find suitable housing for each citizen, in accordance with party and state directives.

There isn't any doubt that we in the party rank-and-file organization, and the masses' organizations in the ministry, are all trying diligently, in coordination with the bureau, to make sincere efforts aimed at ending the severe housing shortage, in accordance with the capabilities allotted for this problem, at the ministry's direction.

[Question] The existing housing shortage, about which everyone is aware, has provoked many heated disputes among some family members, due to the large number of inhabitants in each house. This leads to divorce in full view of everyone. What do you think is the role of the party rank-and-file organization, as a political framework watching over the nature of this facility's work, and urging it to overcome the housing crisis, to protect family members, before disputes creep into their midst, and lead to divorce or some such thing?

[Answer] In fact, the Ministry of Housing appreciates the conditions in which some citizens live, in view of this shortage. With respect to divorce as a result of the crisis, divorce exists. It is not in the form that some imagine. In my opinion, each honorable citizen appreciates the circumstances our country is experiencing.

The comrade members and candidate members in the party rank-and-file organization in our facility play an undoubtedly positive role, since all the members are striving to overcome the obstacles, through discussion of the housing conditions, making proposals, and appropriate solutions leading to the goal which our party desires in this important regard.

[Question] The experiment, which was created by the Ministry of Housing, in coordination with the organization of defense committees, and which was dedicated in the al-Thawrah quarter, is a pilot experiment to renovate houses. Would you say a few words in defense of this experiment, with respect to the graffiti on the walls, and such things as this?

[Answer] In fact, we do not exaggerate when we say that this experiment leads us to hope that it will bring success to all districts, in coordination with the housing units' committees. Regarding the assets earmarked for renovation and maintenance, the Ministry of Housing has a great deal of all types of materials available to it, in addition to paying incentives to qualified personnel, such as carpenters, masons and painters. We also call on the citizenry to encourage this experiment with their initiatives, each in accordance with his ability.

It is the obligation of the committees of housing units, quarters and districts, and the organization structures of popular defense committees, to intensify media and propaganda activity among the populace, to give this experiment the importance it should have, which will of itself assist in dealing with some of the problems confronting the Ministry of Housing. None of us should forget the visit of Comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party's central committee, chairman, Presidium, Supreme People's Council, and prime minister, to al-Thawrah quarter, when he praised this experiment at its dedication.

Regarding the graffiti and writing on the walls, in streets and alleys, we ask everyone to watch for this being done, since they must know, especially in the housing units, those who have first-hand knowledge, so that it can be conveyed to the nearest police station, and the perpetrators brought to account. They should make use of the slogan, "A clean housing quarter is proof of its inhabitants' cleanliness."

[Question] What are the future plans that the Ministry of Housing has drawn up, in light of second 5-year plan guidance?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the plans, which were drawn up by our ministry, extending over the years of the second 5-year plan, are excellent. The plan included constructing 5825 apartments. There is also a fund for emergency jobs for housing projects during the plan, amounting to 68,542,543 dinars. The General Organization for Installations will arrange them, as well as some foreign companies, for the purpose of making housing available as soon as possible. The ministry has recently signed an agreement with a French firm to build 808 apartments, as a first step. Construction will begin this year, in addition to several other projects that the General Organization for Installations and some local contractors will build. The ministry has also worked out a project in which 600 apartments will be built in the al-'Uraysh area. All these projects will deal with the shortage, from which the citizenry suffers. These projects confirm the soundness of our party's policy to make suitable conditions available to all citizens, on all levels.

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CSO: 4802

PRIVATE SECTOR CRITICIZED FOR INADEQUATE INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 24 Feb 81 pp 1, 11

[Article by 'Abd al-Qadir Qadurah, member of the national leadership of the Ba'th Party and deputy prime minister for economic affairs: "The Private Sector and Plans for Expansion"]

[Text] Due to misapplication or intentional or non-intentional distortion, from abroad and from within the country, irrationally or in ignorance, grocers, craftsmen and industrialists believe that socialism means depriving them of what they own. Because of this and the greed and avarice of some people, some of the private capital has fled from areas of industrial and agricultural production to business and services or to activities within their dominion. In other words this sector has abandoned the option to perform its national mission to perform another role as an intermediary for foreign production, or participate in propagating consumption and what results from this in destroying the morals, traditions and values of the community.

If we took the statistical indicators of the past five years into consideration we would notice that the private sector invested only between 60 and 80 million Pounds [Syrian Lira] whereas it invested in 1979 alone more than a billion Pounds in home construction and business. The import total for the private sector of commodities, goods and products last year amounted to about 4 billion Pounds, while during the same year the export total was only 500 million Pounds. Thus the private sector has caused a deficit in the Syrian commercial budget of 3 and 1/2 billion Pounds annually. If we knew that most of the goods imported by the private sector were luxury or consumer imports, we would realize the great injury that this sector has caused to our national economy.

The progress of socialism means, in the first place, achieving economic and social expansion and eliminating exploitation. This does not completely deny an important role for the private sector, especially in the early stages of this expansion, within the general framework of the country's laws and regulations. This role may continue for tens of years, but the private sector's role must be basically in areas of production and not commercial areas or it will turn into a negative role not only with respect to the socialist community but also with respect to the national interests--whatever may be the present political and economic system.

We import hundreds of items of production goods which we can produce locally. Any businessman in our nation can be converted into a producer of these goods, and without costing him a large investment, which would not require more than 2 or 3 workers. This means that the production of these goods is within the dominion of the establishments existing within the socialist system and representing a position of nationalization. At the same time we have thousands of hectares of arable land with no one to farm it, meaning that any investor, whether large or small, can make this investment in agriculture, agricultural industries or in raising cattle, chickens and the like.

Many laws, decisions and directives have been issued containing incentives for national capital to be invested in the various areas of agricultural and industrial production and other areas. However, most of the private sector does not accept the reasonable profit resulting from investment in areas of production so it was turned to construction, commerce and services, attempting to exploit the loopholes in the regulations and laws governing them. It understood the slogans of economic unfolding as being an opening up of consumer commodities and establishing a consumer community, and did not understand the reality that it is facilitating the return of capital that has left the country and establishing investment within the country. So instead of national capital participating in growth and production activity, it performs a negative role impeding this progress, with long-term, hindering social and economic effects.

The pretext that there are no facilities provided by the government for national capital to work in areas of production is rejected because it is not true and is not based on any objective basis. Regulations in effect present all the facilities for whoever wants to invest in production without exploitation. Likewise, the pretext of fear of nationalization is a poor pretext. No small production establishment or small farm will be nationalized because that would be damaging to the economy, in addition to the fact that the basic tasks for this stage and the coming stage are the achievement of economic and social expansion and the establishment of the economic material base, the possession of large production means, investment of national wealth, organizing economic relations and the national economy on new and just non-exploitative foundations--not the nationalization of private agricultural and industrial establishments. The private sector and national capital will retain an important role for many long years to come. So all the pretexts and fears for investment in areas of production are justifications to continue the greed and to justify a foundation for this in actuality.

None of our citizens accepts the transformation of our community to a consumer community, and none of our citizens accepts the transformation of national capital into a tool for the distribution of foreign goods. Nor does the political system accept the national economy becoming brittle in the face of manipulation by those who are concerned with nothing else but importing and distribution, and then smuggling their funds abroad and depositing them in foreign banks--to the detriment of the people, their efforts and labors, and to the detriment of all national production.

Areas are open for national capital to work in production, and regulations in effect should be for this purpose. The state is sincere about developing these regulations to facilitate investment in production areas, striving to maintain the public sector

in a position of leadership in the economy. In all cases the state will absolutely not accept the continued flaunting manipulations of regulations and laws and using any opening, however small, to propagate the spirit of consumerism and serve the foreign producer and his commodities and goods.

National capital is an important foundation in the national economy and from this starting point comes the need to strengthen our confidence in it to carry out its national role in serving expansion and the community.

9785

CSO: 4802

SMUGGLING SEEN AS THREAT TO SECURITY, ECONOMY

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 26 Feb 81 p 4

[Article: "Government Actions to Fight Smuggling Lines"]

[Text] "The government is prepared to listen to any complaint or suggestion supported by figures or witnesses, and is resolved to continue to take the statement of actions against those who toy with the lives and money of the people." This came in a statement by Doctor al-Kasam after the forming of the governmental supreme committee headed by the prime minister and including as its members the ministers of Defense, Interior, Supply, Economy, Industry and Finance, and directors of civilian authorities. For some time this committee has studied the reasons for smuggling, has acquainted itself with the conditions and how to fight it and take decisions and measures to prevent it by studying reports and studies prepared by a special committee to fight smuggling.

This committee is responsible for taking practical actions to provide local materials, goods, products and other items which are being smuggled in large quantities, to lower customs duties on these items, review the customs duty law, etc...

But Is This What Is Necessary?

Is the making of decisions and forming committees enough to deter smugglers and stop smuggling?

Are the decisions which the committee has made or will make be appropriate to the seriousness of this problem phenomenon? Will these decisions succeed and what are the controls to be provided for them to succeed in their task?

We address these questions in fear that the results of the committee's activities will be the same as before, because the previous government formed these types of committees and the result was...no result!?

The reason is that the difficult problem was roots, origins and aspects which are difficult to uproot because they are widespread. As one of the members of the people's council said recently, "The phenomenon of smuggling is a deadly one, crushing our economy."

As A Reminder

The customs director general in 1979 told us immediately after the forming of a committee similar to the present committee:

"The various plans to fight smuggling are not beneficial except to the degree provided by those who are vigilant in the fight against smuggling on one hand, and the various classes of citizens on the other hand with a minimum of awareness and national loyalty with respect to laws and regulations. For there are those who conduct smuggling with the purpose of unlawful earnings and to become rich quickly."

This is not limited, in most cases, to the traditional smugglers from the uneducated peoples of the villages, as there are other classes which are neither uneducated nor traditional who stand behind large smuggling operations. And if these people do not have a minimum of respect for the law and respect for the prestige of the state then there is nothing left for the authorities charged with solving this matter except imposing the law and respect for the state by all means and methods, no matter how hard. It has been observed through the widening base of smuggling in our country that those who practice this smuggling in its traditional form threaten our economy and our national security. Perhaps the most dangerous part of this is that it is not considered by the people to be among dishonorable, shameful or shocking crimes.

So a new impetus to fight the phenomenon of smuggling has begun at the highest level and with an unprecedented zeal. We hope that the citizens will be favorable towards this new step which the authorities have taken, because its achievement will be a public benefit to the citizens as a whole.

The smuggled goods which are placed into the hands of the consumers by smugglers are translated into thousands of millions of Pounds [Syrian Lira] in lost customs duties which are provided by the consumers, but rather go into the pockets of the smugglers.

A financial expert said on this matter:

"Customs duties and taxes are not an end in themselves but rather an instrument in serving economic policy, especially as pertains to encouraging and motivating local industries and fighting smuggling. These duties are considered an important source of national income."

With this simple analysis, we conclude from the true meaning of smuggling, which means "bringing in foreign materials, goods and products through unseen methods into national territory in order to avoid paying duties and taxes, disregarding national industries and local products which were there originally for the interest of the citizen, and to promote the smuggled commodity in various ways."

As for the second part which is smuggling from within the country to outside for the same purpose, which is "avoiding customs duties and taxes and smuggling one of the materials and goods which are needed by the people of the country and exporting it abroad."

9785

CSO: 4802

SYRIA

SURFACE DAMS BUILT THROUGH 1980 LISTED

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 21 Feb 81 p 2

[Article: "Surface Dams Completed Through 1980 in the Country"]

[Text] The number of surface dams completed in the Arab nation of Syria comes to 80 small and medium size dams through the year 1980. They are distributed as follows throughout the provinces:

--Province of al-Hasakah: Bab al-Hadid, al-Jawadi, Karimah, al-Jarrahi, Ma'suq, al-Sawwab, Khirbat al-Hajj, al-Wa'r and Wadi al-Rum dams.

--Province of al-Raqqah: Abu Kahaf dam.

--Province of Aleppo: Shuhada' Umm Jalud and Raju dams.

--Province of Idlib: al-Habit, Ma'arrat and al-Na'man dams.

--Province of Latakia: Saqiyyat Sadiq, Kirsana, Bayt al-Qasir, Barmana, al-Haffah, Balaluran, al-Qanjarah and Kafr Dabil dams.

--Province of Hamah: al-Mubarakat, Sarihin, al-Kaffat, al-Latumah, Masayaf, al-'Ulbawi, Abu Madhi and Wadi al-Gharib dams.

--Province of Hims: Talil al-Muhammadiyah, Khirbat al-Hamman, Maskanat al-Za'franiyan, al-Sandyanah, al-Shandaqiyah, Tall Kalj, al-Berudiyah, al-Dalabuz, Ramm al-'Anz, Tanutah, al-Qaryatayn, Salim, Zakahiyah, Jabbab Shuqra, al-Mari'ah, al-Wadi al-Kabir and al-Walaj dams.

--Damascus: Dumayr, al-Qalamun, al-Qutayfah, Rishah, Wadi al-Qarn, Dayr 'Atiyah, Qarrah and Khan al-Mansurah dams.

--Province of Dar'a: Dar'a al-Sharqi, Abta' al-Kabir, Abta al-Saghir, 'Uthman al-Mitliyah, Ghadir al-Suf, al-Ghariyah al-Sharqiyah, Tasil al-Shaykh Miskin and Gharbi Tafas dams.

--Province of al-Suwayda': Rassas, al-'Ayn, Khazimah, al-Asliyah, Rum Hawilayn, Qaysma, Jabal al-'Arab, al-Mashnaq, Jarran and al-Sahway dams.

--Province of al-Qunaytirah: al-Ruwayhinah and al-Hiffah dams.

It is of note that the damming capacity of the dams completed in the fourth five-year plan is 116 million cubic meters of water. The yield from the land irrigation network of the dams has been 24 million Pounds [Syrian Lira] during the past year.

It has been cited that the purpose of erecting these dams is many-faceted and includes land irrigation, water for cattle, establishing fish farms, drinking water, river-flow purposes, feeding underground water sources and averting floods. It is worth pointing out that some of the dams have not yet been utilized or are in the process of being utilized and that some are to be reexamined for placement into use.

In another vein, the Public Irrigation Installations Company is pursuing a project to implement an irrigation network off the Balaluran dam lake of an area amounting to more than 80,000 hectares.

This dam lies to the right of the public road between Latakia and Kasab: the length of the dam's lake reaches 2.5 kilometers and its width about 1/2 kilometer, and was completed in 1977. The storage capacity amounts to 500 and 1/2 million cubic meters of water.

The final cost of the above dam, including acquisition expenses, came to about six million Pounds, which included research operations for the irrigation network from the lake. The lifetime of the dam was estimated at about 50 years, and the cost of one cubic meter of water at less than one piaster.

Experienced sources in the field of surface dam construction in the country confirm that the Balaluran dam may be the best dam which has been completed, meaning that there are a number of dams whose success has not been appraised. There are numerous reasons which interfere in the success of construction of any small or medium-size surface dam including: a lack of necessary studies, hydrological or geological conditions, the availability of water to fill the dam's lake each year, its exposure to leakage and a loss of a large part of the enclosed water.

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